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Union Dues and Political Contributions 
Great Britain, United States, 
Canada - A Comparison * 
Jan K. Wanczycki 
This paper is concerned with court décisions and 
statutory enactments which had an effect on active partici-
pation of trade unions in political action and, in particular, 
how the Législatures, and the courts in interpreting the 
relevant statutes, attempted to prevent or regularize the 
use of union dues, levies or funds for political purposes. 
The history of the struggle of trade unionism for officiai récognition 
and due place in the social and économie structure of society as the 
spokesman for the interests of the workers has always had political 
overtones. To secure légal framework and protection for the existence 
and activities of trade unions, and to secure better working conditions 
for workers, trade unions, besides exercising économie pressure, had to 
use political weapons as well. Political pressure had to be used in order 
that necessary législation, favourable to the aims of trade unionism, be 
adopted. Like any other mass movement, trade unions sooner or later 
had to enter the political arena, either by forming or affiliating with 
political parties whose primary aim was to protect the rights of the 
workers and to improve their position — like the Labour Party in Great 
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financially contributing to the 
existing political parties or to 
particular candidates who would 
pledge their support to, or ap-
pear more sensitive or friendly 
to the aims of trade unionism. 
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This paper is not concerned with the history of the relationship 
between trade unions and politics, but only with the one aspect restricted 
to court décisions and statutory enactments which had an effect on 
active participation of trade unions in political action and, in particular, 
how the Législatures, and the courts in interpreting the relevant statutes, 
attempted to prevent or regularize the use of union dues, levies or funds 
for political purposes. The subject matter of this paper is to be presented 
as a comparison between Great Britain, the United States and Canada. 
Great Britain 
In Great Britain, the active participation of trade unions in political 
action by financially supporting a political party and candidates and 
members of Parliament became a légal and political issue with the 
formation of the Labour Party in 1906.1 
Financial support from the affiliated trade unions was essential 
to the existence and expansion of the Labour Party, as the party machine, 
the électoral campaigns of the candidates and the maintenance of Labour 
Party members in Parliament were financed mainly by trade union funds. 
Soon, however, the right of trade unions to raise spécial levies and 
the right to use union dues to support the Labour Party or any political 
party was challenged in courts mainly on the ground that such activities 
were contrary to the statutory définition of trade unions and their objects 
as contained in the 1871 and 1876 Trade Union Acts. The additional 
aspects considered by the courts were individual freedom of trade union 
members and the British constitutional approach to the rôle of political 
parties and to the rôle of a member of Parliament. 
The Trade Union Act, 1871,2 defined a trade union, in S. 23, as 
follows : 
S. 23 The term « trade union » means such combination, whethe* 
temporary or permanent, for regulating the relations between work-
men and masters, or between workmen and workmen, or between 
(1) Regarding the history of graduai involvement and participation of trade 
unions in Great Britain in political action that led eventually to the formation of 
the Labour Party see : SIDNEY and BÉATRICE WEBB, The History of Trade Unionism, 
London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1911 ; G.D.H. COLE, A Short Historu of the 
British Working-Class Movement, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1948. 
(2) 34 & 35 Vict, c. 31. 
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masters and masters, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the 
conduct of any trade or business, as would, if this Act had not 
passed, hâve been deemed to hâve been an unlawful combination by 
reason of some one or more of its purposes being in restraint of trade. 
The inclusion in the définition of the words « as would, if this Act 
had not passed, hâve been deemed to hâve been an unlawful com-
bination », etc., implied that the Act applied only to a trade union whose 
rules were in restraint of trade.3 This définition also assumed that ail 
trade unions were illégal at common law as being in unlawful restraint 
of trade.4 To remedy this defect, the définition of trade unions in the 
Trade Union Act Amendment Act, 18765 was amended (S. 16) and 
read as follows : 
S. 16 The term « trade union » means any combination, whether 
temporary or permanent, for regulating the relations between workmen 
and masters, or between workmen and workmen, or between masters 
and masters, or for imposing restrictive measures on the conduct of 
any trade or business, whether such combination would or would not, 
if the principal Act had not been passed, hâve been deemed to hâve 
been an unlawful combination by reason of some one or more of its 
purposes being in restraint of trade. 
By deleting from the original définition the words « as would » and 
by substituting the words « whether such combination would or would 
not », the law assumed that not ail trade unions were illégal at common 
law as being unlawful restraint of trade; further, that with the passage 
of the 1876 Act, it was no longer necessary for a trade union to prove 
its illegality at common law in order to bring itself within the définition 
and protection of the Acts. By the enactment of the 1876 Act, it was 
acknowledged that a trade union could be a lawful body at common 
law and the définition of trade union in S. 16 of the 1876 Act was a 
neutral term covering both légal and illégal bodies at common law. 6 
Regarding the purposes and objects of trade unions, it was assumed 
prior to the passing of the Act of 1871 that a trade union was an asso-
ciation of wage-earners for the purpose of improving or maintaining 
(3) N.A. CITRINE, Trade Union Law, London, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1960, p. 207. 
(4) N.A. CITRINE, op. cit., p. 29 ; R.Y. HEDGES and A. WINTERBOTTOM, The Légal 
History of Trade Unionism, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1930, p. 73. 
(5) 39 & 40 Vict, c. 22. 
(6) N.A. CITRINE, op. cit., pp. 29, 298; R.Y. HEDGES and A. WINTERBOTTOM, 
op. cit., p. 92. 
146 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 21, No. 2 
the conditions of their employrnent. In this capacity, it bargained with 
employers for higher wages, shorter hours, and the like. Also, it was 
assumed that a trade union had the object of a friendly society, providing 
to its members relief when out of work because of sickness, unemploy-
ment or strike. So it was accepted that trade unions had two main 
purposes : trade union purposes and benevolent purposes. 
The Trade Union Act of 1871, in the définition of trade union 
(S. 23) as amended by the 1876 Act (S. 16), referred only to the trade 
union purposes of the union, such as the régulation of the relations 
between workmen and masters without mentioning the benevolent pur-
poses. However, it was assumed that the 1871 and 1876 Acts recognized 
the benevolent purposes as legitimate objects within the scope of trade 
union activities.7 
Since the formation of the Labour Party, whose very existence 
depended on financial support of trade unions, the political activities 
of trade unions and the right to levy political contributions and to use 
union funds for political purposes were challenged in courts on the 
ground that such activities could not be justified under the 1871 and 
1876 Acts and, therefore, were illégal. 
In 1907, the first major court décision regarding the legality of union 
political contributions was decided in favour of the union. In Steele 
v. South Wales Miners' Fédération,8 the action was brought by a mem-
ber of the South Wales Miners' Fédération for a déclaration that a union 
rule which purported to authorize the union to provide funds for main-
taining représentatives in Parliament was ultra vires; for an injunction 
to restraint the union and its officiais from applying any of their existing 
funds for that purpose, and to restrain them from collecting money for 
that purpose from the plaintiff or other members of the Fédération 
against their will. The union in question was a trade union registered 
under the Trade Union Act. The rule of the union (Rule 3, sub-r. 12), 
of which the legality was challenged, read as follows : 
Rule 3(12): « To provide funds wherewith to pay the expenses; of 
returning and maintaining représentatives to Parliament and other 
public councils and boards, and to request them to press forward by 
(7) N.A. CITRINE, op. cit., pp. 84, 85. 
(8) (1907) 1 K.B. 361. 
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every legitimate means ail proposais conducive to the gênerai welfare 
of the members of the fédération. » 
The plaintiff contended that the rule in question was illégal as 
being outside the purposes for which a trade union could lawfully exist. 
The plaintiff claimed that the légal purposes of the unions were limited 
to those specifically stated in Section 16 of the Trade Union Act, 1876, 
and the maintenance of members of Parliament was not one of them. 
The Court rejected this contention. Darling J. held that the définition 
of « trade union » in Section 16 of the 1876 Act was not intended to be 
exhaustive, or to prevent an association from lawfully doing other acts 
beyond those mentioned in S. 16. He added that the section was silent 
about providing benefits for members, which is one of the recognized 
objects of a trade union. He stated : 
So that even if the purposes mentioned in rule 3, sub-r. 12 do not 
corne within those specified in s. 16, there is nothing in that section to 
render them illégal. But, further, I am of opinion that they do fall 
within those specified in s. 16. It seems to me that one of the ways of 
regulating the relations between workmen and masters, or workmen 
and workmen, or masters and masters, is to get laws passed by 
Parliament for their régulation, and that one of the first steps towards 
getting those laws passed would be to send a représentative to Par-
liament to promote a Bill for that purpose. On both thèse grounds 
I am of opinion that rule 3, sub-r. 12, is a valid rule, and that, in 
conséquence, there is no ground for an injunction to restrain the 
défendants from applying any of their existing funds for the purposes 
of that rule. 9 
PhillimorêTj., in his reasons for judgment, was also of the opinion 
that Section 16 of the 1876 Act was not a limiting section at ail. He 
stated : 
It says that any association which has any of the objects specified in 
the section as one of its objects is ipso facto a trade union, but there 
is nothing in it to prevent such a body from having a great number 
of additional objects besides. I believe that since 1871, if not before, 
the collection and administration of benefit funds has been one of 
the objects of a great many, if not most, trade unions, and there is 
nothing about that in S. 16. Therefore I see no reason why this trade 
union should not hâve as one of its objects that which is expressed in 
rule 3, sub-r. 12, for there is nothing in that rule which is illégal at 
common law. I am of opinion, therefore, that injunction cannot be 
granted.10 
(9) îbid., p. 367/8. 
(10) îbid., p. 369. 
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In the Steele case, the Court upheld the legality of having political 
objects as one of the purposes of trade unions and the legality of having 
a fund for parliamentary représentation, provided that such objects were 
included in the rules of a trade union and accepted by a majonty of 
union members. 
The success of trade unions in the Steele case was short-lived and 
this décision was overruled in Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants 
v. Osborne by the Court of Appealxl, which décision was affirmed by 
the House of Lords.12 The House of Lords decided, by a majority, 
that ail trade union political action was illégal. This position was taken 
on the ground that, in the définition of « trade union » in Section 16 of 
the Trade Union Act, no référence was made to political activity and 
that such activity could not be regarded as a necessary subsidiary to the 
union purposes there mentioned. Section 16 of the 1876 Act was exhaus-
tive and enumerated ail union activities, and only benevolent objects 
not specifically mentioned in S. 16 were lawful as being derived by 
reasonable implication from the provisions of the Act. Consequ ently, 
the House of Lords held that a union rule which purported to confer on 
any trade union registered under the Act of 1871 a power to levy 
contributions from members for the purpose of securing and maintaining 
parliamentary représentation was ultra vires and illégal. 
The Earl of Halsbury, in his reasons for judgment, stated that the 
1871 Act was, with regard to trade unions, as it were, the charter of 
incorporation and rendered some union objects lawful which, but for 
the enactment, would be unlawful, and gave a spécifie authority to 
certain contracts and to certain applications of funds that appeared to 
him to be absolutely exhaustive. Further, he stated : 
This statute, I think, gives the charter for ail such « combinations », 
and what is not within the ambit of that statute is, I think, prohibited 
both to a corporation and a combination ; it only exists as a legalized 
combination having power to act as a person and to enforce its 
rules within the limits of the statute, whatever those limits are ; and 
in the matter most relevant to the présent question it has with great 
care protected from interférence three applications of its funds, among 
which it is too obvious for argument that the object now in question 
is not one. It is manifest, therefore, that, if eonfined to the three 
purposes protected by the 4th section, nothing else is within the 
purposes of a trade union as defined by the 23rd or 16th sections of 
(11) Osborne v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (1909) 1 Ch. 163. 
(12) Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne (1910) A.C. 87. 
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the two Acts, and it is impossible to uphold this power of taxing the 
members beyond the purposes for which the trade union exists. 13 
Lord Macnaghten, in his reasons for judgment, stated : 
It is a broad and gênerai principle that companies incorporated by 
statute for spécial purposes, and societies, whether incorporated or not, 
which owe their constitution and their status to an Act of Parliament, 
having their objects and powers defined thereby, cannot apply their 
funds to any purpose foreign to the purposes for which they were 
established, or embark on any undertaking in which they were not 
intended by Parliament to be concerned.14 
Further, Lord Macnaghten stated that there is nothing in any of 
the Trade Union Acts from which it can be reasonably inferred that 
trade unions, as defined by Parliament, were ever meant to hâve the 
power of collecting and administering funds for political purposes. There-
fore, a rule of a trade union which purported to confer such a power on 
any trade union registered under the Act of 1871, whether it be an 
original rule or a rule subsequently introduced by amendment, must be 
ultra vires and illégal. 
Lord Atkinson was also of the opinion that Parliament did not confer 
upon a registered trade union, either expressly or by fair implication, 
power and authority to subsidize, in the manner provided by the im-
peached rule of the union, a scheme of parliamentary représentation; 
consequently, the rule in question was ultra vires. Also, he stated : 
It is not disputed that up to 1903, at ail events, members of trade 
unions were not on joining required to subscribe to any political 
creed, or submit to any political test, no more than are persons who 
become shareholders in a railway company, and, for ail that appears, 
there may be as great a diversity of political views amongst the 
members of the one class as of the other. Freedom of opinion was 
probably permitted amongst the members of both classes because it was 
not the business of either of the bodies to which they respectively 
belonged to support particular political parties or to promote a 
particular political policy. It would be as unjust and oppressive as, in 
my view, it is illégal to compel, by passing rules such as that im-
peached, a member of a trade union, who like the respondent joined 
in the days when freedom of action was permitted, either to contri-
bute to the promotion of a political policy of which he might possibly 
(13) Ibid., p. 93. 
(14) Ibid., p. 94. 
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disapprove, or be expelled from the union to which he belonged for 
so many years and forfeit ail benefit from the money he had 
subscribed.15 
In 1911, by Court décision in Wilson v. Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers 16, the principle established in the Osborne case was extended 
also to securing représentation on municipal and other local bodies 
(other than boards of guardians), at any rate where the levies on the 
members in aid of the funds were in effect compulsory. The question 
whether the same principle applied to the administration of funds for 
the purposes of parliamentary and municipal élections, if the sums 
constituting the funds were voluntarily subscribed by members of a 
trade union, was left undecided. 
In the Osborne case, the principle of ultra vires regarding political 
objects of trade unions and prohibition to levy contributions in support 
of political activities, was applied to a union registered under the 1871 
Trade Union Act. Soon the same principle was extended to unregistered 
unions in Buck v. Typographical Association 17 and in Wilson v. Scottish 
Typographical Association.18 In the latter case, a member of the 
Scottish Typographical Association brought an action for a déclaration 
that certain rules of the Association making provision for the promotion 
of labour représentation in Parliament were ultra vires, illégal, and 
invalid, and were not binding on the plaintiff or any other member of 
the Association; that the Association was not entitled to make payments 
out of its funds to the Labour Party, or for any purpose connected with 
securing or maintaining Parliamentary représentation. The union claimed 
that the Osborne case had no application to an unregistered union; that 
an unregistered union remained a mère voluntary association, legalized 
by the Trade Union Acts, but having power to alter its rules and pur-
poses as it chose, subject only to its own constitution. The Court, 
however, disagreed and, on the ground of the Osborne décision, held 
that the rules complained of were ultra vires, illégal and invalid, and 
were not binding upon the plaintiff or any other members of the Scottish 
Typographical Association. Lord Dundas, in his reasons for judgment, 
was of the opinion that the décision in the Osborne case, both in the 
Court of Appeal and in the House of Lords, was applicable to unre-
(15) Ibid., p. 105. 
(16) (1911) 2 Ch. 324. 
(17) (1910) Lancaster Chancery Court, July 10, 1910, unreported (referred to 
in N.A. Citrine, op. cit., p. 19. 
(18) (1912) 1 S.L.T. 203. 
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gistered as well as régistered unions. He pointed out that Lord Hals-
bury's judgment cited the définitions of « trade union » in the Acts of 
1871 and 1876, and made références to Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the 1871 
Act, ail of which applied to unregistered as well as registered trade 
unions. Consequently, the judicial reasoning underlying the décision in 
the Osborne case was directly applicable to the case at bar, though the 
union involved was not a registered union. Consequently, the union 
rules to which the plaintiff took exception, and the payments to which 
he objected, were ultra vires of the Association and invalid. Lord 
Guthrie also held that the grounds of the Osborne case did not dépend 
on the élément of registration and were applicable to the case of an 
unregistered trade union, like the Scottish Typographical Association. 
TRADE UNION ACT, 1913 
The décision in the Osborne case created financial difficultés for 
the Labour Party members in Parliament who were maintained by the 
financial support provided by the unions. To remedy this situation the 
British Parliament voted in 1911 regular salaries for the members of the 
House of Commons. This measure helped the working class members 
of Parliament but still left the trade union candidates at a disadvantage 
by depriving them of financial support from the unions in électoral 
campaigns. Trade unions, one by one, had been restrained by légal 
injunctions from political contributions and the Labour Party faced the 
disappearance of its sources of income. A political campaign was set 
in motion with a view to passing législation that would reverse the 
effects of the Osborne judgment.19 This was achieved with the enact-
ment of the Trade Union Act, 1913.19a 
The main purpose of the Act was indicated in its long title — « An 
Act to amend the Law with respect to the objects and powers of Trade 
Unions. » The judgment in the Osborne case regarded the Acts of 1871 
and 1876 as the « charter of incorporation » of a trade union, giving a 
trade union the authority to use its funds only for the purposes specified 
in the Acts. Thèse purposes were trade union purposes and benevolent 
purposes, although the latter were not specifically stated. As the political 
objects were not specified in the Acts, the union expenditures for such 
(19) G.D.H. COLE, op. cit., pp . 312, 3 1 3 ; N.A. CITRINE, op cit., p . 19. 
(19a) (2 & 3) Geo. 5, c. 30. Regarding the interprétation of the Act see : N.A. 
CITRINE, op. cit., pp. 20, 299-362; R.Y. HEDGES and A. WINTERBOTTOM, op. cit., 
pp. 96-110. 
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proposes were held beyond the powers conferred by the Acts and, con-
sequently, ultra vires. 
Under the 1913 Act, the objects and powers of the union became 
unlimited. The Act provided that a trade union, in addition to having 
normal trade union objectives as specified in the statute, may be endowed 
under its constitution with any other lawful object or power (including 
political objects), so long as the statutory objects predominate. Whatever 
is authorized by the constitution, the union may so do provided it is not 
unlawful. On the other hand, the union activities outside those sanc-
tioned by the union constitution remained unlawful, not because such 
activities are ultra vires the statutory provisions, but because they would 
be ultra vires the constitution or rules of the trade union and therefore 
they would constitute a breach of contract between the members, which 
is embodied in the rules or constitution.20 However, the inclusion of 
political objects in the union constitution and the expenditure of union 
funds for political purposes was to be restrained and regulated with 
regard to some spécifie political objects by provisions of the Act. 
Because of thèse restrictions imposed in the Act on union political 
activities, the 1913 Act was not a total reversai of the Osborne judgment 
but a compromise. This compromise was accepted by the unions under 
protest. The unions resented the imposition upon them of spécial res-
trictions which were not applied to other bodies; they claimed that they 
had a moral right to take political action as freely as any other society.21 
The widening of objects and powers of trade unions referred to 
above was contained in Section 1 of the 1913 Act, which reads as follows: 
S. 1 — (1) The fact that a combination has under its constitution 
objects or powers other than statutory objects within the meaning of 
this Act shall not prevent the combination being a trade union for the 
purposes of the Trade Union Acts, 1871 to 1906, so long as the 
combination is a trade union as defined by this Act, and, subject to 
the provisions of this Act as to the furtherance of political objects, 
any such trade union shall hâve power to apply the funds of the 
union for any lawful objects or purposes for the time being authorized 
under its constitution. 
(2) For the purposes of this Act, the expression « statutory objects » 
means the objects mentioned in section sixteen of the Trade Union 
Act Amendment Act, 1876, namely, the régulation of the relations 
between workmen and masters, or between workmen and workmen, 
(20) N.A. CTTRINE, op. cit., p. 300. 
(21) G.D.H. COLE, op. cit., p. 314. 
UNION DUES AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 153 
or between masters and masters, or the imposing of restrictive con-
ditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and also the provision 
of benefits to members. 
The expression « a combination » in S. 1 (1) applies to any combin-
ation which is a trade union, whether registered or unregistered.22 
By inserting in subsection (2) of Section I the words « and also the 
provision of benefits to members », the legislator added to statutory 
objects of a trade union the benevolent purposes. This clause was 
inserted apparently because the Osborne case had revealed that Section 
16 of the Act of 1876 omitted from the définition this very important 
function of a trade union. The wording of subsection (2) suggests that 
a society, in order to be recognized as a trade union, must hâve as a 
principal object the provision of benefits to members as well as other 
statutory objects which could be described as essentially trade union 
purposes as described in subsection (2).23 
In order that a society could be recognized as a trade union under 
the Act, and in order that it could under its rules or constitution pursue 
other objects, including political objects, the statutory objects must be 
recognized under its constitution as being the principal objects. In this 
respect, Section 2 (1) of the Act provides : 
2. — ( 1 ) The expression « trade union » for the purpose of the 
Trade Union Acts, 1871 to 1906, and this Act, means any combination, 
whether temporary or permanent, the principal objects of which are 
under its constitution statutory objects : Provided that any combination 
which is for the time being registered as a trade union shall be 
deemed to be a trade union as defined by this Act so long as it 
continues to be so registered. 
The proof that a trade union has under its constitution the statutory 
objects as principal objects is established in the case of registered unions 
by the fact of registration by the Registrar of Friendly Societies. If the 
statutory objects are not principal objects under the union constitution, 
the Registrar must refuse the registration, or he may withdraw certificate 
of registration if, in his opinion, the constitution of the union has been 
altered in such a manner that the statutory objects of the union are no 
longer its principal objects or if, in his opinion, the principal objects 
pursued by the union are not statutory objects. (S . 2 (2) ). 
(22) N.H. CITRINE, op. cit., p . 301. 
(23) R.Y. HEDGES and A. WINTERBOTTOM, op. cit., p . 99. 
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Any unregistered trade union may apply to the Registrar of Friendly 
Societies for a certificate that the union is a trade union within the 
meaning of the Act. The Registrar will grant such a certificate if 
satisfied that under the constitution and in practice the principal objects 
of the union are statutory objects. However, the Registrar may withdraw 
such certificate on an application made to him by any person, if satisfied, 
after giving the union an opportunity of being heard, that the certificate 
is no longer justified. (S . 2 (3) ). 
The Act provides for the right of appeal to courts in case of refusai 
by the Registrar to register a combination as a trade union, or to issue 
a certificate that an unregistered union is a trade union within the 
meaning of the Act, or in case of the withdrawal of a certificate of 
registration ( S. 2 (4) ). 
Further, the Act provided that a certificate of the Registrar that a 
trade union is a trade union within the meaning of the Act of 1913, 
shall, so long as it is in force, be conclusive for ail purposes. (S. 2 (5) ). 
The 1913 Act embodied the principle that a trade union should not, 
or could not, be excluded altogether from participation in political action. 
Further, the Act provided remedy against compelling the minority of 
members of a trade union against their will to subscribe to funds for 
support of a political object or political party with which they were not 
in sympathy or which they opposed.2i The Act applied to registered 
and unregistered unions. 
Section 3 (1) of the Act provided that the funds of a trade union should 
not be applied, either directly or in conjunction with any other trade 
union, association or otherwise indirectly, in furtherance of the political 
objects specified in Section 3 (3) (without préjudice to the furtherance 
of any other political objects), unless two conditions hâve been fulfilled : 
First, the pursuit of those political objects must be approved by a 
majority of the members voting as an object of the union by a ballot 
vote of the members held under spécial ballot rules (specified in Section 
4 (1) ) and approved by the Registrar. Secondly, the union musit adopt 
political fund rules, approved whether the union is registered or not, by 
the Registrar of Friendly Societies, providing for the keeping of a sepa-
rate political fund and for the exemption of any member who does not 
wish to contribute by followmg the procédure of « contracting out ». 
(24) R.Y. HEDGES and A. WINTERBOTTOM, op. cit., p . 103. 
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Further, the political fund rules must provide that a member who is 
exempt from the obligation to contribute to the political fund of the 
union shall not be excluded from any benefits of the union or placed in 
any respect, either directly or indirectly, under any disability or at any 
disadvantage as compared with other members of the union (except in 
relation to the control or management of the political fund); and that 
contribution to the political fund shall not be made a condition for 
admission to the union.a5 
It was commented that statutory restrictions under S. 3 (1) on the 
furtherance of political objects by trade unions do not apply to ail poli-
tical aims of a trade union but only to the application of the funds of 
the union to the political purposes specified in S. 3 (3). Other political 
objectives are free from régulation and are legitimate objects under S. 1 
(1) of the Act if sanctioned by the constitution and not otherwise 
illégal;26 and in pursuance of such other political objects the gênerai 
funds of the union may be used without a ballot or the adoption of 
political fund rules. Where the pursuit of political objectives of any 
kind is authorized by the constitution, and at the same time the political 
fund rules hâve been adopted with respect to political objects enume-
rated in S. 3 (3), the union, in its pursuit of political objects outside 
Section 3 (3), is not confined to using the political fund, but may also 
use its gênerai funds.27 
(25) S. 3 (1 ) The funds of a trade union shall not be applied, either directly or 
in conjunction with any other trade union, association, or body, or otherwise 
indirectly, in the furtherance of the political objects to which this section applies 
(without préjudice to the furtherance of any other political objects), unless the 
furtherance of those objects has been approved as an object or the union by a 
resolution for the time being in force passed on a ballot of the members of the 
union taken in accordance with this Act for the purpose by a majority of the mem-
bers voting ; and where such a resolution is in force, unless rules, to be approved, 
whether the union is registered or not, by the Registrar of Friendly Societies, are 
in force providing : 
( a ) That any payments in the furtherance of those objects are to be made out of 
a separate fund (in this Act referred to as the political fund of the union), and for 
the exemption in accordance with this Act of any member of the union from any 
obligation to contribute to such a fund if he gives notice in accordance with this 
Act that he objects to contribute ; and 
( b ) That a member who is exempt from the obligation to contribute to the political 
fund of the union shall not be excluded from any benefits of the union, or placed 
in any respect either directly or indirectly under any disability or at any disadvantage 
as compared with other members of the union (except in relation to the control 
or management of the political fund) by reason of his being so exempt, and that 
contribution to the political fund of the union shall not be made a condition for 
admission to the union. 
(26) R.Y. HEDGES and A. WINTERBOTTOM, op. cit., p . 104. 
(27) N.H. CITRINE, op. cit., p . 334. 
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Also, it was noted that from Section 3 (1) it follows that any 
subséquent altération of the political fund rules, whether of a registered 
or unregistered union, must be approved by the Registrar of Friendly 
Societies.28 
The Act does not require that political funds of the unions must 
be used only for political purposes. Ail union funds, political and other-
wise, are funds of the union and may be used as authorized by the 
constitution. On the other hand, the rules of the union may restrict 
the use of political funds to political purposes exclusively.29 
Statutory restrictions contained in Section 3 (1) regarding the use 
of union funds are limited to political objects enumerated in subsection 
(3) of Section 3 of the 1913 Act, which reads as follows : 
S. 3 (3 ) The political objects to which this section applies are the 
expenditure of money— 
(a ) on the payment of any expenses incurred either directly or 
indirectly by a candidate or prospective candidate for élection to 
Parliament or to any public office, before, during, or after the élection 
in connection with his candidature or élection ; or 
( b ) on the holding of any meeting or the distribution of any literature 
or documents in support of any such candidate or prospective can-
didate ; or 
( c ) on the maintenance of any person who is a Member of Parliament 
or who holds a public office ; or 
( d ) in connection with the registration of electors or the sélection 
of a candidate for Parliament or any public office ; or 
( e ) on the holding of political meetings of any kind, or on the 
distribution of political literature or political documents of any kind, 
unless the main purpose of the meetings or of the distribution of 
the literature or documents is the furtherance of statutory objects 
within the meaning of this Act. 
The expression « public office » in this section means the office of 
member of any county, county borough, district, or parish council, 
or board of guardians, or of any public body who hâve power to 
raise money, either directly or indirectly, by means of a rate. 
Subsection (4) of Section 3 provided that a resolution under Section 
3 « approving political objects as an object of the union shall take effect 
(28) N.H. CITRINE, op. cit., p . 335. 
(29) N.H. CITRINE, op. cit., p . 336. 
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as if it were a rule of the union and may be rescinded in the same 
manner and subject to the same provisions as such a rule ». 
The significant aspect of this provision is that, while the resolution 
to further spécifie political objects and to establish political funds under 
Section 3 (3) has to be approved by a ballot taken in conformity with 
Section 4 (1), in rescinding such resolution (which has become part of 
the union rules or constitution), the normal procédure used in rescinding 
union rules has to be followed. The resolution adopted under S. 3 (1) 
does not impose an obligation on a union to pursue political objects and 
the union may abstain from implementing such resolution without 
rescission or amendment.80 
Subsection (5)S1 of Section 3 deals with associations of unions and 
makes such associations or combinations a single unit at least for the 
furtherance of political objects and the establishment of a political fund. 
A ballot of the aggregate membership of the component unions must be 
taken, and the resolution passed by a majority of those voting. Such 
association must maintain a separate political fund and provide for the 
exemption of individual members. However, the component union may 
act as collecting agent on behalf of the association, notwithstanding the 
fact that such component union may hâve its own political fund.82 
Section 3 (1) of the Act requires a resolution by a majority of the 
union members voting, approving the furtherance of the political objects 
specified in Section 3 (3). Further, it is specified that such a resolution 
has to be « passed on a ballot of the members of the union taken in 
accordance with this Act . . . » 
The ballot referred to in Section 3 (1) and the statutory conditions 
imposed on such ballot are specified in Section 4 (1). Thèse conditions 
are as follows : 
(a) The ballot should be taken in accordance with rules of the 
union; 
(30) N.A. CrraiNE, op. cit., pp . 350-351. 
(31) S. 3 (5 ) The provisions of this Act as to the application of the funds of a 
union for political purposes shall apply to a union which is in whole or in part an 
association or combination of other unions as if the individual members of the 
component unions were the members of that union and not the unions ; but nothing 
in this Act shall prevent any such component union from collecting from any of 
their members who are not exempt on behalf of the association or combination any 
contributions to the political fund of the association or combination. 
( 32 ) R.Y. HEDGES and A. WINTERBOTTOM, op. cit., p . 105 ; N.H. O T R I N E , op. cit.. 
pp. 351-352. 
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(b) The rules of the union relating to the ballot should be approved 
by the Registrar of the Friendly Societies, whether the union 
is registered or not; 
(c) The Registrar should not approve any such rules unless he is 
satisfied: 
(i) That every member of the union has an equal right, and, 
if reasonably possible, a fair opportunity of voting; 
(ii) That the secrecy of the ballot is properly secured. 
The right of individual union members to "contract out" from 
contributions to the political fund of the union adopted by the majority 
of union members in compliance with Section 3 (1), 3 (3) and 4 (1) was 
already stated in Section 3 (1) (a). Section 5 3 3 spells out the détails of 
the procédure to be observed in « contracting out » from political con-
tributions. This procédure is as foliows : 
A union member may at any time give an « exemption notice » that 
he objects to contributing to the political fund of the union. The notice 
may be given in a form set out in the Schedule to the Act34, or « in a 
form to the like effect. » 
(33) Section 5 reads as follows : 
5.—( 1 ) A member of a trade union may at any time give notice, in the form set 
out in the Schedule to this Act or in a form to the like effect, that he objects to 
contribute to the political fund of the union, and, on the adoption of a resolution of 
the union approving the furtherance of political objects as an object of the union, 
notice shall be given to the members of the union acquainting them that each 
member has a right to be exempt from contributing to the political fund of the union, 
and that a form of exemption notice can be obtained by or on behalf of a member 
either by application at or by post from the head office or any branch office of the 
union or the office of the Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
Any such notice to members of the union shall be given in accordance with rules 
of the union approved for the purpose by the Registrar of Friendly Societies, having 
regard in each case to the existing practice and to the character of the union. 
(2 ) On giving notice in accordance with this Act of his objection to contribute, a 
member of the union shall be exempt, so long as his notice it not withdrawn, from 
contributing to the political fund of the union as from the fîrst day of January next 
after the notice is given, or, in the case of a notice given within one month after 
the notice given to members under this section on the adoption of a resolution 
approving the furtherance of political objects, as from the date on which the 
member's notice is given. 
(34) Schedule 
Form of Exemption Notice 
Name of Trade Union 
Political Fund (Exemption Notice) 
I hereby give notice that I object to contribute to the Political Fund of 
the Union, and am in 
conséquence exempt, in a manner provided by the Trade Union Act,. 1913, 
from contributing to that fund. 
A B 
Address 
day of 19 
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When the union adopts the resolution approving the furtherance 
of political objects as an object of the union, the members of the union 
should be given a notice acquainting them that each member has a right 
to be exempt from contributing to the political fund of the union and 
how a form of exemption notice can be obtained. 
On giving « exemption notice », a union member is free from con-
tributing to the political fund of the union so long as his notice is not 
withdrawn. 
The very essence of the « contracting out » procédure is that the 
onus is upon the union member to object to contributions to political 
funds by giving the exemption notice; unless he gives such notice, he is 
assumed to hâve accepted ail the obligations of membership contained 
in the union rules, including the obligation to contribute to the political 
fund of the union. The « contracting out » System has been considered 
more favourable to trade unions when compared with the « contracting 
in » System introduced by the 1927 Act. 
Section 6 35 deals with methods of contributing to political funds 
and how exemptions from contributing can be effected. It spécifies 
that the political fund may be raised in one of two ways; either by a 
separate levy of political contributions or by allocation to that fund of 
the whole or part of the periodical contributions which the members are 
required to pays for the gênerai purposes of the union. 
Where the political fund is raised by a separate levy, the rules of 
the union must provide that no other moneys of the union shall be 
carried to that fund. Those members of the union who « contracted 
out » under Section 5 are exempt from paying political levies, and only 
those who did not « contract out » are bound to pay. 
(35) S. 6 — Effect may be given to the exemption of members to contribute to 
the political fund of a union either by a separate levy of contributions to that fund 
from the members of the union who are not exempt, and in that case the rules 
shall provide that no moneys of the union other than the amount raised by such 
separate levy shall be carried to that fund, or by relieving any members who are 
exempt from the payment of the whole or any part of any periodical contributions 
required from the members of the union towards the expenses of the union, and 
in that case the rules shall provide that the relief shall be given as far as possible 
to ail members who are exempt on the occasion of the same periodical payment and 
for enabling each member of the union to know as respects any such periodical 
contribution, what portion, if any, of the sum payable by him is a contribution to 
the political fund of the union. 
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In the case where the political fund is raised by allocation from 
contributions paid into the gênerai fund, the union members who « con-
tracted out » are relieved from paying that portion of union dues (or 
any periodical contributions) that is allocated to the political fund. The 
union rules should also provide that each member of the union who did 
not « contract out » should know what portion, if any, of his periodical 
contributions to the gênerai fund of the union is allocated to the political 
fund. 
The Act gives any union member who considers he is aggrieved by 
a breach of political fund rules relating to the matters specified in S. 3 
(1) (a) (b), the right of complaint to the Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
The Registrar, after hearing the parties involved, may issue an order for 
remedying the breach. Such order, when recorded in the County Court, 
may be enforced as if it had been an order of the County Court (S. 3(2)). 
TRADE DISPUTES AND TRADE UNIONS ACT, 1927 
After the gênerai strike of 1926, the Trade Disputes and Trade 
Unions Act, 192788 was passed. It restricted the trade union activities 
in a number of ways. The restrictions applied to strikes, to the law of 
picketing, to the union membership of civil servants, to employées of 
local or other public authorities with regard to union membership, and 
with regard to political funds of the unions. 
With regard to the contribution towards the union political fund, the 
most important change was the replacement of the « contracting out » 
formula by « contracting in ». Under the « contracting in » formula, 
notwithstanding that a union had adopted political objects and political 
fund rules by majority décision, it was still prohibited for a union to 
levy political contributions unless a union member gave a notice in 
writing of his willingness to contribute to such fund ( S. 4 (1) ). It was 
noted that the effect of this pprovision was to deprive unions of the 
benefit of the inertia of members holding no strong political opinions 
and to shift the burden of the inertia against the pursuit of political 
objects.ST 
(36) (17 & 18) Geo. 5, c. 22, repealed by the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions 
Act, 1946, (9 & 10) Geo. 6, c. 52. 
(37) N.H. CITRINE, Ibid., p. 23. 
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Another restrictive measure with regard to the furtherance of poli-
tical objects of the union was the provision ( S. 4 (2) ), which made it 
necessary that the contributions to the political fund should be levied 
separately from any other contributions; it was no longer possible to 
allocate to the political fund the whole or part of gênerai contributions 
(with appropriate réductions for those members who were exempted). 
Further, it was specifically stated that no assets of a trade union other 
than those forming the political fund could be directly or indirectly 
applied or charged in furtherance of any political object to which Sec-
tion 3 of the 1913 Act applied. 
Finally, the 1927 Act provided ( S. 4 (6) ) that an unregistered union 
having a political fund was required to make to the Registrar of Friendly 
Societies an annual return with respect to receipts, expenditures, assets 
and liabilities insofar as the political fund was concerned in pursuance 
to Section 16 of the Trade Union Act, 1871, which provided for the 
transmission to the Registrar of Friendly Societies of annual returns by 
registered trade unions. 
TRADE DISPUTES AND TRADE UNIONS ACT, 1946 
The 1927 Act was resented by the trade union movement and the 
repeal of the Act became one of the aims of the Labour Party. This was 
accomplished when the Labour Party returned to power in 1945. One 
of the first acts of the Labour government was the enactment of the 
Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1946,38 which repealed the 1927 
Act in its entirety.89 
With the repeal of the 1927 Act, the rules regarding political objects 
and political funds again became subject to the provisions of the 1913 
Act exclusively. 
(38) (9 & 10) Geo. 6, c. 52. 
(39) The 1946 Act consists of two sections and a schedule containing transitional 
provisions. Section 1 reads: 
1. The Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927 (in this Act referred to as 
« the Act of 1927 » ) is hereby repealed, and, subject to the transitional provisions 
set out in the Schedule to this Act, every enactment and rule of law amended or 
otherwise affected by that Act shall, as from the commencement of this Act, hâve 
effect as if the Act of 1927 had not been passed. 
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The United States 
The American trade-union movement claims to hâve produced the 
world's first labour party in Philadelphia in 1828;40 however, it never 
produced anything like the Labour Party in Great Britain and, up to the 
présent day, as a whole, avoided identifying itself with distinctive labour 
or socialist political parties. Various explanations hâve been given for 
the weakness of socialism within the organized labour movement in the 
United States and for the absence of an American labour party : the 
vitality of American capitalism; the middle-class psychology of Ame-
rican workers; the American faith in indvidiual rights; the conservative 
features of the American political system, the anti-socialist rôle of the 
Roman Catholic church and the anti-socialist leadership of Samuel 
Gompers.41 
Perhaps the most convincing reason for this lack of enthusiasm for 
a distinctive labour party is the egalitarian character of American Socie-
ty; the lack of distinctive social classes and the absence of the working 
« prolétariat » which hâve been the historical tradition of Europe, in-
cluding Great Britain; unlimited prospects (at least in theory) of material 
(and therefore social) advancement open to everybody; and the middle 
class « bourgeois » psychology of the American workers. The basic 
attitude of American labour towards political action was epitomized in 
the Gompers* exhortation to « reward friends and punish enemies ». 
In spite of the fact that the American labour movement did not 
create a distinct working class political party, the American unions hâve 
always been involved in politics.42 « One cannot draw a line between 
(40) In that year, the Philadelphia Mechanics' Union of Trade Associations 
established the Working Men's Party in Philadelphia. See JOHN R. COMMONS and 
Associates, History of Labour in the United States, Vol. I, New York, 1918, Part II, 
Chapter II ; « Rise and Growth in Philadelphia », pp. 185-230. Also, références in 
MARC KARSON, American Labor Unions and Politics, 1900-1918, Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1958, p . 3 ; JACK BARBASH, « The Structure of Union Political 
Action — A Trial Analytic Framework », Industrial Relations Research Association, 
1965, Buffalo, published in the Labor Law Journal, August 1965, Volume 16, No. 8, 
pp. 491-496, on p . 493 ; J. ALBERT W O L L , « Unions in Politics : A Study in Law 
and the Workers' Needs », Southern Califomia Law Review, (1961) , Volume 34, 
pp. 130-151, on p . 145 ; É.J. FILLENWARTH, « Politics and Labor Unions », Notre 
Dame Lawyer, (1961) , Vol. 37, pp. 172-193, contains a comprehensive historical 
outline of the involvement of the U.S. Trade Unions in political activities (pp . 175-
180). 
(41) M. KARSON, op. cit., Chapter 10 — « A n interprétation of the Politics of 
American Labor Unions », p . 286. 
(42) J. BARBASH, « T h e Structure of Union Political Action...» ibid., p . 493. 
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bargaining and politics », stated counsel for U.A.W.-C.I.O. before the 
Suprême Court of the United States.43 
While operating within the framework of the traditonal two party 
System, the unions hâve become powerful pressure groups in order to 
secure législation favorable to workers and trade unions, to defeat mea-
sures which hâve appeared detrimental to their interests, to support 
candidates who pledged their support to trade union législative objec-
tives. 44 
The growth of trade unions, their wealth and political influence 
and the appréhension of this influence gave impulse to législation that 
was aimed to impose some restrictions on political activities of trade 
unions. 
The restrictive provisions regarding union political activities derived 
from a statute enacted in response to a plea, among others, by Samuel 
Gompers, the président of the American Fédération of Labor (A.F. of 
L.), for législation to free the élections from the power of money con-
tributed by corporations.45 The original Act was passed by Congress 
in 1907 46 making it unlawful for a bank or any corporation organized 
by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a « money contribution » 
in connection with any élection to any political office, and in connection 
with any élection at which Presidential and Vice-presidential candidates 
or a Représentative in Congress is to be voted for or any élection by any 
state législature of a U.S. senator. 
In 1925, the original prohibition contained in the 1907 Act was 
incorporated in Section 313 of the Fédéral Corrupt Practices Act4T and 
(43) U.S. v. V.A.W. (1957) 32 Labor Cases, para. 70, 534, quoted in JOHN F. 
LANE, « Analysis of the Fédéral Law Governing Political Expenditures by Labor 
Unions » Labor Law Journal, October 1958, Vol. 9, No 10, pp. 725-744, on p. 725. 
(44) Article II of the Constitution of the A.F. of L.-C.I.O. contains twelve 
« Objectives and Principles », two of which provide that A.F.L.-C.I.O. is organized : 
5. To secure législation which will safeguard and promote the principle of free 
collective bargaining, the rights of workers, farmers and consumers, and the security 
and welfare of ail the people and to oppose législation inimical to thèse objectives. 
12. While preserving the independence of the labor movement from political 
control, to encourage workers to register and vote, to exercise their full rights and 
responsibiîities of citizenship, and to perform their rightful part in the political life 
of the local, state and national communities. Quoted in E.J. FILLENWARTH, « Politics 
and Labor Unions », ïbid., p. 178, footnote 41. 
(45) Hearings before House Committee on Elections, 59th Congress, lst Session, 
referred to in the décision of the U.S. Suprême Court, in the U.S. v. U.A.W. (1957) 
32 Labor Cases, para. 70,534. 
(46) 34 Stat. 864. 
(47) 43 Stat. 1070. 
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strengthened (1) by changing the phrase « money contribution » to 
« contribution » broadly defined, (2) by extending the prohibition on 
corporate contributions to the élection to Congress of Delegates and 
Résident Commissioners; and (3) by penalizing the récipient of any 
forbidden contribution as well as the contributor.48 
As enacted in 1925, Section 313 of the Fédéral Corrupt Practices 
Act did not apply to labour organizations. In 1943, when Congress 
passed the War Labor Disputes Act49 (the Smith-Connally Act) to se-
cure defence production against work stoppages, the Act contained a 
provision extending to labour organizations, for the duration of the war, 
Section 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act. 
Commenting on the législative history of the 1943 Act in U.S. v. 
C.I.O.50 Mr. Justice Reed of the U.S. Suprême Court stated that Con-
gress believed that labour unions should be put under the same restraint 
as had been imposed upon corporations. It was also felt that the in-
fluence which labour unions exercise over élections through monetary 
expenditures should be minimized, and that it was unfair to individual 
union members to permit the union leadership to make contributions 
from gênerai union funds to a political party which the individual mem-
ber might oppose.B1 
In 1945, the Senate Spécial Committee on Campaign ExpendituresB2 
considered, inter alla, a complaint that, despite the extension of Section 
313 to labour unions, the C.I.O. had distributed in the national élections 
of 1944, 200,000 coppies of a political pamphlet opposing the re-election 
of Senator Taft. The C.I.O. contended however, that the Act only 
referred to « contribution » whereas the publication in question involved 
an « expenditure » and consequently this outlay of money was not pro-
hibited under the Act.53 
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT 
With the enactment in 1947 of the Taft-Hartley Act,64 the tem-
porary wartime extension to trade unions of Section 313 of the Corrupt 
(48) U.S. v. U.A.W., ihîd., on p. 93,447. 
(49) 57 Stat. 163, 167. 
(50) (1948) 15 Labor Cases, para. 64,586. 
(51) Ibid., on p. 73,803. 
(52) 79th Congress, lst Sess. 
(53) U.S. v. U.A.W., (1957) 32 Labor Cases, para. 70,534, on p. 93,448. 
(54) The Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (61 Stat. 136). 
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Practices Act became permanent. Section 313 of the Corrupt Practices 
Act as amended by Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, besides making 
permanent application of Section 313 to labour organizations, proscribed 
any « expenditure » as well as any « contribution » to « plug the existing 
loophole », and extended its coverage to fédéral primaries and nomi-
nating conventions. While the prohibition applied to both the contri-
butor and the récipient, only the penalty for the contributor was spelled 
out. 
Since then, Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act has been incor-
porated in the U.S. Criminal Code, as Section 610.55 It was amended 
in 195156 to subject to its penalties any person who accepted or received 
any prohibited contribution, as well as any person or organization which 
made or consented to prohibited expenditures or contributions. Also, in 
the case of a wilful violation, the maximum penalty against individual 
violators was increased to a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for two 
years or both.67 
As amended, at présent the provision reads as follows : 
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by 
authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expend-
iture in connection with any élection to any political office, or in 
connection with any primary élection or political convention or caucus 
held to sélect candidates for any political office, or for any corporation 
whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or expend-
iture in connection with any élection at which Presidential and Vice-
Presidential electors or a Senator or Représentative in, or a Delegate 
or Résident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in con-
nection with any primary élection or political convention or caucus 
held to sélect candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any 
candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive 
any contribution prohibited by this Section. 
Every corporation or labor organization which makes any contribution 
or expenditure in violation of this section shall be fîned not more than 
$5,000 ; and every officer or director of any corporation, or officer of 
any labor organization, who consents to any contribution or expenditure 
by the corporation or labor organization, as the case may be, and any 
person who accepts or receives any contribution, in violation of this 
section, shall be fîned not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more 
than one year, or both ; and if the violation was wilful, shall be 
fîned not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both. 
(55) 18 U.S.C. Ch. 29, Sec. 610. 
(56) Act of October 31, 1951, Ch. 655, Sec. 28(c). 
(57) CCH (American) Labor Law Reporter, Vol. 3, para. 4980, on p. 10,181. 
166 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 21, No. 2 
For the purposes of this section « labor organization » means any 
organization of any kind, or any agency or employée représentation 
committee or plan, in which employées participate and which exists 
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers con-
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of 
employment or conditions of work. 
The provision quoted above makes it unlawful for both corporations 
and labour unions to make any contribution or expenditure in connection 
with fédéral élections and does not forbid expenditures in state and 
local élections.58 The prohibition covers Presidential and Vice-Presi-
dential élections, élection of Senators, Représentatives, Delegates or 
Résident Commissioners to Congress, primary élections, political con-
ventions, and caucuses. The provision prohibits both contributions and 
expenditures and as it is phrased without any qualification, it is extre-
mely broad.69 
The définition of the terni « labor organization » restricts itself to 
organizations and agencies which exist for the purpose « in whole or in 
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, 
wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work ». 
Apparently the purpose of this définition is to make a distinction between 
trade unions as such and such political outgrowths of the labour move-
ment as the Committee on Political Education (COPE).60 
(58) Some states enacted législation restricting political contributions or expend-
itures by labour unions. Apparently in only four states (Indiana, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania and Texas ) has such législation remained on the statute books : 
J. ALBERT W O L L , « Unions in Politics ; A study in Law and the Workers Needs », 
ibid., on pp. 134-136 ; SAR A. LEVITAN, « Government Régulation of Internai Union 
Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members », Daily Labor Report, No. 109, June 1958, 
Spécial Supplément No. 13, on p. 16. 
(59) CCH, (American) Labor Law Reporter, Vol. 3, para. 4980, p . 10,181. 
(60) CCH, (American) Labor Law Reporter, Vol. 3, para. 4980, p . 10,182. 
The Committee on Political Education -COPE- resulted from amalgamation of the 
political committees of the A.F. of L. and C.I.O., following the merger of the 
A.F.L. and the C.I.O. in 1955. The program of the Committee on Political Education 
includes « more intensive campaigning for labor's friends and against labor's 
enemies ». COPE is made up of local and State Committees of A.F.L.-C.I.O. 
members, and a national committee consisting of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. Executive 
Council and officers of international unions. It is voluntarily financed by dollar 
drives as were its predecessor committees. Of every dollar contributed, half is used 
by local and State Committees and the other half is used by national COPE « to 
aid worthy candidates for national offices ». The policies of COPE are determined 
by the National Committee of COPE in the light of action by A.F.L.-C.I.O. con-
ventions, but the endorsements for the Senate and House are made by state and 
district units of the Committee. (From the brief prepared by the U.S. Solicitor 
General to the United States Suprême Court in U.S. v. U.A.W. (1957) (32 Labor 
Cases, para. 70,534) as quoted in J.F. LANE « Political Expenditures by Labor 
Unions », ibid., on p . 742. 
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There are doubts as to the constitutional validity of this provision 
as infringing on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and 
of the press, contained in the First Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States, which provides : 
« Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press ; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to 
pétition the Government for a redress of grievances. » 
It is necessary for the purpose of this article to examine how the 
courts approached this issue of constitutionality and how they inter-
preted the extremely broad prohibition on contributions and expendi-
tures contained in the statute.61 
In 1948, in Reuther v. Clark,62 the union brought an action before a 
spécial three-judge fédéral court to enjoin the enforcement of Section 
304 of the Taft-Hartley Act on the basis that the prohibition of expen-
ditures by labour organization in connection with fédéral élections is 
unconstitutional. The union admitted that union funds had already 
been expended contrary to the provisions of the Act and stated that the 
attorney gênerai had threatened to prosecute any union for making such 
expenditures. The union also asked for a declaratory judgment that 
Section 304 is unconstitutional on the following grounds : (1) It unlaw-
fully restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly and pétition; (2) It 
deprives the union, its officers and members of liberty and property 
without due process of law, in that it prevents them from acting jointly 
for political objectives and prevents them from using joint property for 
such purposes; (3) It unlawfully prevents free élections by restricting 
joint politcal activities essential thereto; (4) It unlawfully discriminâtes 
against them and dénies them equal protection of the laws in that it is 
not applicable to other unincorporated groups with opposing interests; 
(5) It is so vague and uncertain as to provide no ascertainable standards 
of guilt. Finally, the complaint asserted that the restrictions imposed by 
the statute were not justified by a clear and présent or any other danger 
to American institutions or to the government of the United States. 
(61) In the légal décisions analysed in this article, the statutory prohibitions on 
spending of union funds for électoral purposes are referred to either as Section 304 
of Taft-Hartley Act, or Section 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act, or Section 610 
of U.S. Criminal Code (18 U.S.C. Sec. 610); for the purpose of clarity and con-
sistency références will be made to Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, except 
when excerpts from the décisions are quoted and the prohibition is referred to as 
Section 313 (of the Corrupt Practices Act) or Section 610 (of the U.S. Criminal 
Code). 
(62) (1948) 14 Labor Cases, para. 64,504; pp. 73,459-73,460. 
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The District Court, District of Columbia, dismissed the action on 
the ground that the facts alleged were insufficient to justify the exercise 
of equity powers to enjoin the prosecution of acts in violation of the 
ternis of the statute in question, and consequently the court should not 
render a declaratory judgment concerning the constitutionality of the 
statute. This was especially true, the Court added, in view of the ad-
mitted deliberate violation of the law, which might subject the plaintiffs 
to criminal prosecution, in which event they woud hâve the opportunity 
of directly attacking the constitutionality of the statute. 
In 1948, in U.S. v. C.I.0.63 the U.S. Suprême Court considered the 
question regarding the scope of application and the constitutionality of 
Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The C.I.O. and its prési-
dent were charged with violation of the Section in question because 
« The C.I.O. News », a weekly periodical owned and published by the 
C.I.O. at the expense and from the funds of the C.I.O., published a 
statement urging ail members of the C.I.O. to vote for a particular can-
didate in the fédéral élection of 1947. 
The statement said it was made despite Section 304 in the belief 
that the Section was unconstitutional because it abridged rights of free 
speech, free press and free assembly, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 
The District Court64 held that Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Aot, 
which makes it unlawful for any labor organization to make contribution 
or expenditure in connection with any élection at which candidates for 
a fédéral office are to be selected or voted for, and which provides pénal 
sanctions for unions offending against the ban as well as for the union 
officers consenting to such action, was invalid on its face since it abridged 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, which 
are guaranteed under the First Amendment to the federad constitution. 
Consequently, the charge against the C.I.O. and its président of violating 
the provisions of Section 304 was dismissed. The District Court also 
held that the circumstances surrounding the enactment of Section 304 
do not point out to « clear and présent danger » which must exist if any 
abridgment of the Freedoms of the First Amendment is to be justified. 
On appeal, the U.S. Suprême Court held that Section 304 of the 
Taft-Hartley Act did not make it an offense for a union to expend its 
(63) (1948) 15 Labor Cases, para. 64,586; pp. 73,799-73,821. 
(64) (1948) 14 Labor Cases, para. 64,384. 
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funds for publication of an issue of a regular union periodical containing 
statements in support of a candidate for nomination or élection for cer-
tain fédéral offices in furtherance of the union's aims, or to expend funds 
for the distribution of such publication in regular course to those accus-
tomed to receiving copies thereof. Further, the Suprême Court held 
that an indiotment which charges a union with expenditures for such 
publication and distribution, but does not allège the source of the fund 
expended or charges the distribution of free copies to persons not en-
titled to receive them, does not state an offence within the scope of the 
Act. Consequently, the Suprême Court dismissed the indictment for 
failure to state an offence under the Act. Also, the Suprême Court de-
clared that, in those circumstances there was no need to détermine the 
constitutionality of Section 304. 
The majority of the Suprême Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice 
Reed, held, in particular the following : 
It will be noted that paragraph (3) 66 (of the indictment) does not 
allège the source of the C.I.O. funds. The paragraph indicates on 
its face that « The C.I.O. News » was a regularly published weekly 
periodical of which the challenged issue was Volume 10, No. 28. 
The funds used may hâve been obtained from subscriptions of Us 
readers or from portions of C.I.O. membership dues, direcily allocated 
by the members to pay for the « News », or from other gênerai or 
spécial receipts66 (emphasis added). 
Further, the Court noted that Senator Taft, during the passage of 
the Act, stated on the Senate floor that funds voluntarily contributed for 
élection purposes might be used without violating the Section and papers 
supported by subscriptions and sales might likewise be published. Then 
the Court added : 
(65) « (3) That at ail the times hereinafter mentioned, the said défendant C.I.O. 
owned, composed, edited and published a weekly periodical known as « The C.I.O. 
News », and the said défendant C.I.O. paid ail of the costs and made ail of the 
expenditures necessary and incidental to the publication and distribution of said 
periodical, « The C.I.O. News », from the funds of the said défendant C.I.O., 
including the salaries of the editors and contributors and other writers of texts 
set forth in said periodical including also the costs of the printing of the said 
periodical and the cost of the distributing of the said periodical, and ail such 
payments and expenditures, including those representing the costs and distribution 
of the issue of said « The C.I.O. News » under date of July 14, 1947, and designated 
as Volume 10, No. 28, were made by said défendant C.I.O. at Washington, in the 
District of Columbia, and within the jurisdiction of this court. U.S. v. C.I.O. (1948) 
15 Labor Cases, para. 64,586, Footnote (3) on p. 73,801. 
(66) U.S. v. C.I.O. (1948) 15 Labor Cases, para. 64,586, on p. 73,801/2. 
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Members of unions paying dues and stockholders of corporations know 
of the practice of their respective organizations in regularly publishing 
periodicals. It would require explicit words in an Act to convince us 
that Congress intended to bar a trade journal, a house organ or a. 
newspaper, published by a corporation, from expressing views on 
candidates or political proposais in the regular course of its publication. 
It is unduly stretching language to say that the members or stock-
holders are unwilling participants in such normal organizational 
activities, including the advocacy thereby of governmental policies 
affecting their interests, and the support thereby of candidates thought 
to be favourable to their interests. 
It is our conclusion that this indictment charges only that the C.I.O. 
and its président published with union funds a regular periodical for 
the furtherance of such aims, that Président Murray authorized the 
use of those funds for distribution of this issue in regular course to 
those accustomed to receive copies of the periodical and that the 
issue with the statement described at the beginning of this opinion 
violated para. 313 of the Corrupt Practices Act. 
We are unwilling to say that Congress by its prohibition against 
corporations or labor organizations making an « expenditure in con-
nection with any élection » of candidates for fédéral office intended 
to outlaw such a publication. W e do not think para. 313 reaches 
such a use of corporate or labor organization funds. We express no 
opinion as to the scope of this section where différent circumstances 
exist and none upon the constitutionality of the sections. 67 
In a separate opinion, four members of the Court concurred with 
the majority in the resuit but not in the reasoning. They expressed a 
strong view that the Section was violating the First Amendment and 
was unconstitutional. The last paragraph of their opinion stated : 
A statute which, in the claimed interest of free and honest élections, 
curtails the very freedoms that make possible exercise of the franchise 
by an informed and thinking electorate, and does this by indiscriminate 
blanketing of every expenditure in connection with an élection, serving 
as a prior restraint upon expression not in fact forbidden as well as 
upon what is, cannot be squared with the First Amendment. 68 
In 1949, in U.S. v. Painters' Local Union No. 4SI,69 the United 
States Court of Appeals relying on the Suprême Court décision in the 
C.I.O. case, supra, held that small expenditures made by a small local 
(67) lbid.t on p . 73,806/7. 
(68) Ibid., on p . 73,820. 
(69) (1949) 16 Labor Cases, para. 64,953; pp. 75,023-75,025. 
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union, which publishes no newspaper of its own, for a newspaper adver-
tisement and for a radio broadcast opposing certain candidates for Fé-
déral office, were not unlawful, where thèse means are a natural way 
for the union to communicate its opinion to its members, and where the 
expenditures were duly authorized by vote of the union members. The 
Court held that such expenditures are no différent in principle from those 
made by a union for the publication of political statements in the union's 
own newspaper, which expenditures had been held in the C.I.O. case, 
supra, by the U.S. Suprême Court not to be within the scope of Section 
304 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Circuit Judge Augustus N. Hand, ren-
dering the judgment of the Court, concluded : 
We should bear in mind the further important considération that ail 
of the Justices of the Suprême Court who participated in the C.I.O. 
décision regarded the prohibition of the Statute if applied to the 
facts of that case either as involving an undue abridgment of the rights 
of free speech, free press, and free assembly, or at best as of exceed-
ingly doubtful constitutionality. Because of the similarity of the facts 
before us to those in the C.I.O. décision abovë-mentioned we do not 
feel free to regard the issue of constitutionality as one completely of 
first impression, as did Judge Hincks in his thoughtful opinion. Under 
the circumstances we are constrained to hold that the statute did 
not cover the publications effected by the défendants in the case 
at bar.70 
The Court of Appeals dismissed the indictment for failure to allège 
an offence under Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
In 1951, the prohibitions under Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act 
received another restrictive interprétation. In U.S. v. Construction and 
General Laborers Local 264,71 the Fédéral District Court, relying on 
the Suprême Court décision in the C.I.O. case, supra., ruled that Con-
gress did not intend to include within prohibited expenditures of labour 
union the payment of compensation to a union employée who was en-
gaging in political activity on behalf of a particular candidate while in 
the employment of a trade union, or the payment of compensation to a 
person for work in securing the registration of voters or in transporting 
voters to the poils on eleotion day. Further, the Court held that évi-
dence that employées of a union received their regular compensation 
and extra compensation while they were devoting a part of their time 
to political activities on behalf of an union officer who was running for 
(70) Ihid., on p. 75,025. 
(71) (1951) 21 Labor Cases, para. 66,736; pp. 80,766-80,773. 
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élection to Congress and to the registration and transportation of voters 
in the élection in which such officer was a candidate, was not sufficient 
to establish a violation of Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Again, 
the Court did not find it necessary to rule on the constitutionality of the 
provision in question because of its findings that the expenditures under 
review were not prohibited under the Act. 
In 1957, the second major interprétation of Section 304 of the Taft-
Hartley Act by the U.S. Suprême Court took place in U.S. v. United 
Automobile Workers 72 in which case the legality of use of union dues 
to pay for political broadcast was the issue. While in the C.I.O. case, 
supra., the U.S. Suprême Court found that certain union expenditures 
for political purposes in connection with fédéral élections are not pro-
hibited by the Act, in the U.A.W. case the Suprême Court held that the 
use of union dues to pay for political broadcasts would, if proven, cons-
titute a violation of the Act. 
The indictment charged the union with violation of the Act by 
paying from the gênerai treasury fund for political télévision broadcasts 
in support of certain candidates for the U.S. Congress during the 1954 
primary and gênerai élections, and designed to influence the electorate. 
The indictment charged specifically that the fund used came from union 
dues, was not obtained by voluntary political contribution or subscrip-
tion from members and was not paid for by advertising or sale. The 
District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it did not 
allège a statutory offence. 
On appeal, the U.S. Suprême Court distinguished the C.I.O. case, 
supra., on the ground that the communication (« The C.I.O. News ») for 
which the défendants in the C.I.O. case were indicted, unlike the union-
sponsored political broadcast, was neither directed nor delivered to the 
public at large but only to the union members or purchasers of an issue 
of a weekly newspaper owned and published by the C.I.O.. Mr Justice 
Frankfurter, who rendered the majority décision, stated that the evil at 
which Congress had struck in Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, was 
the use of corporation or union funds to influence the public at large to 
vote for a particular candidate or a particular party. The Court held 
that the alleged activity (if proven) would constitute a violation under 
Section 304. The Court stated that to deny that such activity, either 
(72) (1957) 32 Labor Cases, para. 70,534; pp. 93,443-93,455. 
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on the part of a corporation or a labour organization constituted an 
« expenditure in connection with any (fédéral) élection » would be to 
« deny the long séries of congressional efforts calculated tô avoid the 
deleterious influences on fédéral élections resulting from the use of 
money by those who exercise control ovec large aggregations of capital ». 
The Court reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the 
case to the District Court for prosecution to proceed. The Suprême 
Court refused to consider the constitutionality of Section 30473 pointing 
out among others, that allégations of the indictment may not survive 
« the test of proof » during a trial on merits. In remanding the case to 
the District Court, the Suprême Court posed four questions « not to 
imply answers to problems of statutory construction, but merely to 
indicate the covert issues that may be involved in this case ». Thèse 
questions were as follows : 
1) Was the broadcast paid for out of the gênerai dues of the union 
membership or may the funds be fairly said to hâve been ob-
tained on a voluntary basis? 
2) Did the broadcast reach the public at large or only those affi-
liated with the union? 
3) Did it constitute active electioneering or simply state the record 
of particular candidates on économie issues? 
4) Did the union sponsor the broadcast with the intent to affect 
the results of the élection? 
The minority of the judges (Douglas, Warren and Black) questioned 
the constitutionality in Section 304 in view of the First Amendment that 
Congress shall make no law that abridges free speech or freedom of 
assembly. Among other arguments, Mr. Justice Douglas stated the 
foliowing : 
Finally, the Court asks whether the broadcast was « paid for out of 
the gênerai dues of the union membership or may the funds be fairly 
said to hâve been obtained on a voluntary basis ». Behind this question 
( 73 ) The union in its brief stated : 
. . . if such an expenditure is prohibited by Section 18 U.S.C. 610, the statute violâtes 
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States in that the statute ( i ) abridges 
freedom of speech and of the press and the right peaceably to assemble and to 
Eetition ; ( ii ) abridges the right to choose senators and représentatives guaranteed y Article 1, para. 2 of the Seventeenth Amendment; (iii) créâtes an arbitrary 
and unlawful classification and discriminâtes against labor organizations in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment, and (iv) is vague and indefinite and fails to provide a 
reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments. (1957) 32 Labor Cases, footnote 2, on p. 93,451. 
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is the idea that there may be a minority of union members who are 
of a différent political school than their leaders and who object to the 
use of their union dues to espouse one political view. This is a question 
that concerns the internai management of union affairs. To date, unions 
hâve operated under a rule of the majority. Perhaps minority rights 
need protection. But this way of doing it is, indeed, burning down 
the house to roast the pig. Ail union expenditures for political discourse 
are banned because of a minority might object. 
If minorities need protection against the use of union funds for political 
speech making, there are ways or reaching that end without denying 
the majority their First Amendment rights. 7 4 
At this point, Mr. Justice Douglas stated : 
There are alternative measures appropriate to cure this evil which 
Congress has seen in the expenditure of union funds for political 
purposes. The protection of union members from the use of their 
funds in supporting a cause with which they do not sympathise 
may be cured by permitting the minority to withdraw their funds from 
that activity. The English hâve long required labor unions to permit 
a dissenting union member to refuse to contribute funds for political 
purposes. Trade Union Act, 1913, 2 & 3 Geo. V, c. 30 ; Trade Disputes 
and Trade Unions Act, 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. V, c. 22 ; Trade Disputes 
and Trade Unions Act, 1946, 9 & 10, Geo. VI, c. 5 2 . 7 5 
Finally, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that « The Act, as construed and 
applied, is a broadside assault on the freedorn of political expression 
guaranteed by the First Amendment ».76 
As remanded to the District Court, the trial on merits took place 
before a jury and resuted in a jury verdict acquitting the union.77 
In 1960, another clarification was made of Section 304 of the Taft-
Hartley Act by the U.S. District Court in U.S. v. Teamsters, Local 688.78 
The Court ruled that contributions or expenditures by a labour union 
in connection with the élection of fédéral candidates are lawful provi-
ding that : (1) the officers of the union consent; (2) the contributions 
or expenditures are made from funds voluntarily designated for such 
(74) Ibid., on p . 93,454. 
(75) Ibid., on p . 93,454, footnote 1. 
(76) Ibid., on p . 93,455. 
(77) Regarding the détails of this trial, see J.F. LANE, «Political Expenditures 
by Labor Unions », Ibid., pp. 733-735. 
(78) (1960-1961) 41 Labor Cases, para. 16,601, pp. 23,380-23,382. 
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purposes by ail or a part of the individual members of the union;79 
(3) there is a good-faith accounting of such funds; and (4) the amount 
contributed or expended does not exceed the amount of funds so de-
signated. Further, the Court held that there is a voluntary désignation 
of funds for such purposes where approximately two-thirds of the mem-
bers of a local union sign cards authorizing the allocation of a specified 
portion of their union dues for that purpose. An interprétation of the 
law which would prohibit political contributions or expenditures by 
unions under thèse circumstances would be, in the opinion of the Court, 
of doubtful constitutional validity. Also, the Court held that the law 
prohibiting political contributions or expenditures by unions or corpo-
rations requires proof of criminal intent to sustain a conviction. While 
the évasion of the provisions of the law in question is unlawful, avoi-
dance is not. 
It should be noted that the judgment in question brought to the 
interprétation of Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act a concept remi-
niscent in certain aspects of the British System of « contracting in » as 
enforced between 1927 and 1946 and creating in this way a political 
fund constituted by the allocation of a part of union dues to such fund 
by individual union members. However, it should be noted that, under 
the British system of « contracting in », when a union member refused 
to contract in, his union dues were reduced by the amount allocated for 
political purposes; while in the U.S. context a refusai would not resuit 
in the réduction of union dues. The union member would still hâve 
to pay his whole union dues which would go entirely to the gênerai 
union fund and be used for non-political activity.80 
The récent décision regarding the interprétation of Section 304 of 
the Taft-Hartley Act is the décision in 1961 of the U.S. District Court in 
Alaska in U.S. v. Anchorage Central Labor Council.81 In this case, the 
Court held that a joint union council did not violate the statutory pro-
hibition against union political expenditures by sponsoring four 15-
minute televised political broadcasts as, in the opinion of the Court, the 
payments were made from a fund composed primarily of voluntary con-
tributions made by member locals to defray the costs of the CounciTs 
(79) In the case at bar, the individual union members signed the cards authorizing 
such allocation. 
(80) JOSEPH L. RAUH, « Legality of Union Political Expenditures», Southern 
California Law Review, (1961) Volume 34, pp. 152-164, on p. 154. 
(81) (1961) 42 Labor Cases, para. 16,910, pp. 24,366-24,370. 
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regular weekly télévision programs. The Court relied to a great extent 
on the four points suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in U.S. v. Auto-
mobile Workers case, supra., for the construction of the section in ques-
tion. The Court considered as the most important for considération in 
the case at bar, whether or not the broadcasts complained of were paid 
for out of the gênerai union dues of the union membership or whether 
the funds may « be fairly said to hâve been obtained on a voluntary 
basis ». In considering this question, the Court added new éléments 
into the meaning of voluntary contributions. The Court found that the 
broadcasts were paid by the Anchorage Central Labour Council, largely 
from the so-called « TV fund » contributed by the several unions who 
were members of the Council. Thèse contributions were made for the 
purpose of financing not the particular programs under considération by 
the Court but to finance the entire broadcast program conducted over a 
period of some three years. Thèse TV contributions were purely volun-
tary. No union was called upon to pay for this program. Each union 
decided by a vote of its membership, first, whether it would contribute 
and, second, how much. (Apparently the individual union members did 
not sign cards authorizing the allocation of a specified portion of their 
dues to be used for contributions to the TV fund, as was the situation in 
U.S. v. Teamsters, Local 688, supra., in relation to allocation of funds for 
électoral purposes.) The évidence also showed that the cost of broad-
casting programs sometimes exceeded the voluntary TV contributions 
and then the Labour Council covered the déficit from the fund received 
from the per capita tax paid by the unions who formed the Labour 
Council. However, the amounts paid by the unions into the Council in 
1958 as TV fund exceeded the costs of thèse four political broadcasts, 
which were indicted. Consequently, the Court held that there was no 
proof that the political broadcasts in question were paid for by per 
capita tax. But, even if they were paid out of the per capita tax, the 
latter tax was voluntary because, in the opinion of the Court, no union 
needed to belong to the Council. If it did, such a union paid per capita 
tax of ten cents per member. But the per capita tax was not enforced. 
Each union could décide how much it could afford to pay. A union of 
a thousand members could pay a per capita tax on, lets say, five hundred 
members, which, in the opinion of the Court, made the per capita tax 
a voluntary one. 
Another question considered by the Court was regarding the source 
of the funds of the several unions contributing to the TV fund and 
whether or not the statute intended to include such indirect contribu-
tions. 
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The évidence before the Court showed that some, at least, of the 
unions had sources of income other than dues, as, for example, rental of 
property owned by the union, or interest on savings accounts or bonds. 
Ail thèse funds were commingled into one gênerai fund. Consequently, 
it would be impossible to say whether the TV contributions and the per 
capita tax were paid out of dues or other income. 
The Court also considered whether the broadcasts reached the 
public at large. The answer was that a télévision program would reach 
to some extent the public at large. However, the Court thought that 
there was another problem already considered previously by the courts, 
that broadcasting was used regularly as the only means the unions or 
Labour Council had or used to communicate with its members. The 
évidence was that the costs were considerably lower than trying to get 
out a newspaper to ail of the members of the some twenty-five unions 
belonging to the Council. The Court held, relying on the décisions inter-
preting the statute, that under such a circumstance the fact that the 
broadcast was communicated to the gênerai public did not bring the 
acts clearly within the prohibition of the statute when such means was 
used in the regular course of the union activities and was based upon 
voluntary contributions by the unions for such programs. 
In its concluding remarks, the Court stated that the purposes of the 
statute, which are clearly expressed in the Court décisions and in the 
debates before Congress, are two : 
First, to prevent, in the public interest, corporations and labour 
unions with their power and wealth from controlling élections; and, se-
cond, to protect the union member from having union officiais endorse 
candidates or attempt to influence voters which may be contrary to the 
wishes of the individual member. In view of thèse principles, the Court 
did not find that the broadcast was an act to control élections. And, so 
far as the consent of the members is concerned, the Court noted that 
each union (the membership of the union) voted to contribute thèse 
funds to the program, so the matter of protection of the union member 
was not involved in the question at bar. 
In conclusion, the court held that the broadcasts in question were 
the resuit of voluntary contributions to the TV fund of the Labour Coun-
cil, and the statute was not designed to prohibit this type of activity. 
Consequently, the Court granted the motion for acquittai. 
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In summing up the situation under and effects of Section 304 of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, it could be stated that the courts referring to the légis-
lative history of the provision, took the position that the prohibitions 
contained in Section 304 were intended to apply only to union funds 
called gênerai funds of the union and built up from regular union dues 
and assessments, and that Section 304 did not affect voluntary contribu-
tions from union members collected for political purposes over and abo-
ve regular union dues. The unions could use such voluntary contribu-
tions for the purposes of fédéral élections (U.S. v. United Automobile 
Workers). 
Further, insofar as gênerai union funds are concerned, the courts 
found lawful the use of such funds for the following purposes : 
a) the support of candidates for fédéral élection in régula]: union 
periodicals distributed primarily to union members (U.S. v. 
C.W.); 
b) newspaper advertisements or radio or télévision broadcasts by 
small local unions which publish no newspapers of their own, 
opposing of supporting certain candidates, providing that thèse 
means are a normal way for the union to communicate its opi-
nions to their members and providing that the expenditures are 
duly authorized by the vote of the union members (U.S. v. 
Paint ers Local Union No. 481); 
c) registration of voters or transporting voters to poils on élection 
day (U.S. v. Construction and General Laborers, Local 264). 
Further, political expenditures were found lawful when the funds 
used came from voluntary authorization by union members to use a 
certain part of union dues for political purposes (U.S. v. Teamsters, 
Local 688). 
The constitutional validity of Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act 
is doubtful. Some judges of the U.S. Suprême Court, expressing the 
minority opinions, held the Section invalid as contrary to the freedoms 
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, 
the U.S. Suprême Court studiously avoided making a décision regarding 
the constitutionality of the Section. This situation led one author to 
express the view that Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act is almost 
certainly invalid.82 
(82) ALISTER MCALISTER, « Labor, Liberalism and Majoritarian Deraocracy », 
Fordham Law Review, (1963) Volume 31, pp. 661-696, on p. 691. 
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RAILWAY LABOR ACT 8 3 
Apart from the prohibitions contained in Section 304 of the Taft-
Hartley Act, the problem of the use of union dues for political purposes 
has been considered by the United States' courts in connection with the 
union shop agreements entered into under Section 2, Eleventh of the 
Railway Labor Act, which was written into the statute in 1951.84 
Section 2, Eleventh provides that, notwithstanding the law of « any 
state », a carrier and a labour organization may conclude a collective 
agreement requiring ail employées within a stated time (60 days) to 
become members of the labour organization, provided there is no dis-
crimination against any employée and provided that membership is not 
denied or terminated « for any reason other than the failure of the 
employée to tender the periodic dues, initiation fées, and assessments 
(not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of 
acquiring or retaining membership ». Also the section allowed agree-
ments regarding check-off of union dues on condition that the employée 
provides the employer with a written revocable assignment to the union 
of such dues, initiation fées and assessments.85 
(83) Originally enacted in 1926 (44 Stat. 577). 
(84) 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. para. 152 (1958). Prior to 1951, the Railway 
Labor Act prohibited union shop agreements. The 1934 amendment to the Act 
stated that no carrier « shall require any person seeking employment to sign any 
contract or agreement promising to join or not to join a labor organization » 
(48 Stat. 1186). 
( 85 ) The relevant parts of Section 2, Eleventh read as follows : 
S. 2, Eleventh. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, or of any other 
statute or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any state, any carrier 
or carriers as defined in this Act and a labor organization or labor organizations 
duly designated and authorized to represent employées in accordance with the 
requirements of this Act shall be permitted — 
(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that 
within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective 
date of such agreements, whichever is the later, ail employées shall become members 
of the labor organization representing their craft or class : Provided, That no such 
agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employées 
to whom membership is not available upon the same tenus and conditions as are 
generally applicable to any other member or with respect to employées to whom 
membership was denied or terminated for any person other than die failure of the 
employée to tender the periodic dues, initiation fées, and assessments (not including 
fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining 
membership. 
(b) to make agreements providing for the déduction by such carrier or carriers 
from the wages of its or their employées in a craft or class and payment to the 
labor organization representing the craft or class of such employées, of any periodic 
dues, initiation fées, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly 
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership : Provided, That no 
such agreement shall be effective with respect to any individual employée until he 
shall hâve furnished the employer with a written assignment to the labor organization 
of such membership dues, initiation fées, and assessments, which shall be revocable 
in writing after the expiration of one year or upon the termination date of the 
applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner. 
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The issues raised under Section 2, Eleventh were basically two : 
1) whether the union security agreements providing for union 
shops and maintenance of membership forcing the employées 
to join the union within a specified period of time and to remain 
union members in good standing, were constitutionally valid 
provisions; 
2) whether the union dues collected under the union shop agree-
ment could be used by the union for political purposes or cau-
ses to which the individual member might object. 
Before considering thèse two issues, it should be noted that the Rail-
way Labor Act, unlike the Taft-Hartley Act, did not contain provisions 
making compulsory unionism provisions ineffective in the states which 
prohibit them.86 On the contrary, the provisions of Section 2, Eleventh 
apply « notwithstanding any . . . other statute . . . of any state ». In 
other words, the right-to-work laws enacted by some states do not apply 
to union shop agreements negotiated under the Railway Labor Act. 
Further, the prohibitions under Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act 
were restricted to contributions and expenditures in connection with 
fédéral élections. Section 304 did not apply to state or local élections. 
The states were left free if they wished to enact législation prohibiting 
the unions to contribute to state of local élections, and some states did 
enact such législation.87 
The controversy regarding the use, for political purposes, of union 
dues exacted under the union shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act 
affected not only political expenditure for fédéral élections but also for 
state and local élections, and any other expenditures for political pur-
poses, such as, expenditures to promote or to oppose the passage of 
spécifie measures, state or fédéral. 
The constitutional validity of union shop agreements under the 
Railway Labor Act was upheld by the U.S. Suprême Court in Railway 
Employées' Department v. Hanson.88 The Court held that the union 
shop provisions are permissive and not compulsory; that such provisions 
are a valid exercise of the right of Congress to regulate interstate com-
(86) CCH, (American) Labor Law Reporter, Vol. 2, para. 4,550, on p. 9,601. 
(87) See footnote 58. 
(88) (1956) 30 Labor Cases, para. 69,961 ; pp. 91,581-91,588. 
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merce; that Congress, under that authority has the right to ensure indus-
trial peace along the arteries of such commerce and has great latitude 
in choosing the means for doing so. Any such choice is a matter of 
policy. In permitting union shop agreements, Congress made a décision 
on a matter of policy with which the Court cannot interfère. 
Also, the Court held that, under the fédéral supremacy clause (Arti-
cle VI) of the U.S. Constitution, a union shop contract, authorized by the 
Railway Labor Act, notwithstanding the law of any state, cannot be 
made illégal or unenforceable by the provisions of a state right-to-work 
law limiting union security contracts, if the fédéral law is valid. Fur-
ther, the Court held that the union shop provision of the Act do not 
infringe the constitutional rights of employées to freedom of conscience, 
association or thought, since the Act explicitly provides that member-
ship may not be made subject to any conditions except the payment of 
periodic dues, initiation fées and assessments. But the Court added a 
very important caveat that « if other conditions are in fact imposed, or 
if the exaction of dues, initiation fées, or assessments is used as a cover 
for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the 
First Amendment, this judgment will not préjudice the décision in that 
case. »89 
Finally, the Court held that a requirement for financial support of 
a collective bargaining représentative by ail employées who receive the 
benefits of its représentation is within the power of Congress under its 
right to regulate interstate commerce and does not infringe individual 
rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. 
Immediately following this décision, the Texas Suprême Court in 
Sandsberry v. International Association of Machinists90 held that the 
adoption of a union shop agreement for employées of an interstate rail-
road is authorized by the union shop provisions of the Railway Labor 
Act which supersedes the Texas Right-to-Work Act, provided that such 
an agreement requires the employées to pay only periodic dues, initiation 
fées and assessments uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or 
retaining membership in the contracting union. However, a union-shop 
contract as permitted by the Railway Labor Act does not require pay-
ment of political assessments. Mr. Justice Culver, rendering the majority 
judgment, stated : 
(89) Ibid., on page 91,587. 
(90) (1956) 30 Labor Cases, para. 70,131 ; pp. 92,160-92,173. 
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We think a political assessment was not contemplated by the Congress 
in using the term « assessments » in the union shop statute, nor thait 
the failure to pay a political assessment would be a valid ground for 
discharge. 
Surely the United States Suprême Court in considération of Hanson 
case, if not otherwise, judicially knew of union political activity and 
that funds to carry on that activity are assential. We are of course 
bound by that décision and can say no more tlian « if the exaction of 
dues, initiation fées, or assessments is used as a cover for forcing 
ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First 
Amendment, this judgment will not préjudice the décision in that 
case ». 91 
In 1961, the U.S. Suprême Court reached a very important décision 
regarding the use, for political purposes, of union dues exacted under 
the union shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act. This was the 
judgment in International Association of Machinists v. S.B. Street,92 The 
circumstances of the case were as follows. A group of labour organiz-
ations and the carriers composing the Southern Railway System, entered 
into a union shop agreement pursuant to the Act. The agreement re-
quired the employées of the carriers, as a condition of continued em-
ployment, to pay the union representing their particular class or craft 
the periodic dues, initiation fées and assessments uniformly required as 
a condition of acquiring or retaining union membership. Some of the 
employées brought an action in the Superior Court of Bibb County, 
Georgia, alleging that the money each was thus compelled to pay to 
hold his job was in substantial part used to finance the campaigns of 
candidates for fédéral and state offices whom he opposed, and to promo-
te the propagation of political and économie doctrines, concepts and 
idéologies with which he disagreed.93 
(91) Ibid., on page 92,163. 
(92) (1961) 42 Labor Cases, para. 17,009; pp. 24,667-24,699. 
(93) Ibid., on pages 24,668/69. It would also appear that the allégations in the 
Superior Court covered also the prohibitions contained in Section 304 of the Taft-
Hartley Act, that is, the use of union dues to finance the campaigns of candidates 
for fédéral office, Desides the expenditures not covered by the prohibitions contained 
in the Taft-Hartley Act such as the financing of électoral campaigns for state 
offices, the promotion of political and économie doctrines, concepts and idéologies 
apparently as a gênerai object of the unions and not necessarify connected with 
any spécifie électoral campaign, as well as the promotion of législative programs. 
However, the U.S. Suprême Court stated (on page 24,680, footnote 21) that « No 
contention was made below or hère that any of the expenditures involved in this 
case were made in violation of the Fédéral Corrupt Practices Act, 18 U.S.C. 
para. 610, or any state corrupt practices législation ». 
UNION DUES AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 183 
The Superior Court found that the allégations were proved and 
enjoined the enforcement of the union shop agreement on the ground 
that Section 2, Eleventh violâtes the Fédéral Constitution to the extent 
that it permits such use by the trade unions of the funds exacted from 
employées. The Suprême Court of Georgia upheld the ruling, which 
décision was appealed to the U.S. Suprême Court. 
In its judgment, the U.S. Suprême Court had stated (Mr. Justice 
Brennan) that, in the Hanson case, supra, the court upheld the consti-
tutional validity of Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act on its 
face, and not as applied to infringe the particular constitutional rights of 
any individual. Thus, ail that was held in the Hanson case was that 
Section 2, Eleventh was constitutional in its bare authorization of union 
shop contracts requiring workers to give « financial support » to unions 
legally authorized to act as their collective bargaining agents. But the 
Court did not make any décision in the Hanson case regarding forced 
association in any other aspect nor regarding the issue of the use of 
exacted money for political causes which were opposed by the em-
ployées. In the case at bar, each employée who brought the action 
made known to the union representing his craft or class his dissent from 
the use of his money for political causes which he opposed. The Court 
examined the législative history of the Section in the context of the de-
velopment of unionism in the railroad industry under the Act, to déter-
mine whether a construction is « fairly possible » which dénies the au-
thority to a union, over the employée^ objections, to spend his money 
for political causes which he opposes. The Court concluded that such 
a construction was not only « fairly possible » but entirely reasonable; 
consequently, the Court found it unnecessary to décide whether or not 
this section could constitutionally permit the use of exacted funds for 
political purposes contrary to a member's wishes. 
The analysis of the législative history led the Court to the conclusion 
that Section 2, Eleventh contemplated compulsory unionism to force 
employées to share the costs of negotiating and administering collective 
agreements and the costs of the adjustment and settlement of disputes. 
However, there was no indication that Congress also meant in Section 2, 
Eleventh to provide the unions with a means for forcing employées, over 
their objection, to support political causes which they oppose. 
Further, Mr Justice Brennan stated that the Court could assume that 
Congress was fully conversant with the long history of intensive involve-
ment of the railroad unions in political acticities. Then he added : 
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But it does not follow that para. 2, Eleventh places no restriction 
on the use of an employee's money, over his objection, to support 
political causes he opposes merely because Congress did not enact a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing expenditures. 94 
The Court held that the Section in question did not vest the unions 
with unlimited power to spend exacted money. The purpose of this 
Section was to eliminate « free riders » by permitting a union to exact 
dues and other fées from ail members of the bargaining unit; however, 
the political use of funds to support candidates for public office and 
advance political programs does not further this purpose, since such 
a use does not help defray either the expenses of negotiations or admi-
nistration of union contracts or the expenses entailed in the adjustment 
of disputes. Consequently, the Court held that Section 2, Eleventh 
dénies the unions, over an employee's objection, the power to use his 
exacted funds to support political causes which he opposes. However, 
the Court held that this interprétation of the Section did not involve any 
curtailment of the traditional political activities of the railroad unions. 
It meant only that those unions must not support those political acti-
vities, against the expressed wishes of a dissenting employée, with his 
exacted money. 
Further, the Court held that, although a union may not use exacted 
fées for political purposes over a members objection, the union security 
provision (union shop agreement) is not itself unlawful, and an injunction 
restraining collection of ail funds would not be appropriate, particularly 
where such an order would interfère with the bargaining duties imposed 
on the union by the Act. 
Further Mr. Justice Brennan stated : 
Whatever may be the powers of Congress of the States to forbid unions 
altogether to make various types of political expenditures, as to which 
we express no opinion hère, many of the expenditures involved in 
the présent case are made for the purpose of disseminating information 
as to candidates and programs and publicizing the positions of the 
unions on them. As to such expenditures an injunction would wor'k a 
restraint on the expression of political ideas which might be offensive 
to the First Amendment. For the majority also has an interest in 
stating its views without being sïlenced by the dissenters. To obiain 
the appropriate reconciliation between majority and dissenting interests 
in the area of political expression, we think the courts in administering 
(94) îbid., on p. 24,678. 
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the Act should sélect remédies which protect both interests to the 
maximum extent possible without undue impingement of one on the 
other.95 ( Emphasis added ). 
Then the Court proceeded to suggest two possible remédies which 
may be enforced with a minimum of administrative difficulty °6 and 
with little danger of encroachment on the legitimate activities or ne-
cessary functions of the union. 
In the opinion of the Court, any remedy would properly be granted 
only to employées who hâve made known to the union officiais that they 
do not désire their funds to be used for political causes to which they 
object. But the dissent is not to be presumed — it must affirmatively 
be made known to the union by the dissenting employée. The two 
possible appropriate remédies suggested by the Court were as follows : 
1) An injunction against expenditure for political causes opposed 
by an employée of a sum which is the same proportion of the 
total money exacted from him as the union's total political 
expenditures is of the entire union budget. However, the union 
should not be in a position to make up such sum from money 
paid by a nondissenter, for this would shift a disproportionate 
share of the costs of collective bargaining to the dissenter and 
hâve the same effect of applying his money to support such 
political activities. 
2) Restitution to an individual employée of that portion of his 
money which the union expended, despite his notification, for 
the political cause he opposed. However, there should be no 
necessity for the employée to trace his money up to and in-
cluding its expenditure; if the money goes into gênerai funds 
and no separate accounts of receipts and expenditures of the 
funds of individual employées are mentioned, the portion of 
his money the employée would be entitled to recover, would 
(95) Ibid., on p. 24,680. 
(96) In footnote 22 on page 24,681 the Court stated the following : 
We note that the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 
requires every labor organization subject to the fédéral labor laws to file annually 
with the Secretary of Labor a financial report as to certain specified disbursements 
and also « other disbursements made by it including the purposes thereof... » 
para. 201 (b) (6). Each union is also required to maintain records in sufïicient 
détail to supply the necessary basic information and data from which the report 
may be verified. Para. 206. The information required to be contained in such report 
must be available to ail union members. Para. 201 (c). 
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be in the same proportion that the expenditures for political 
purposes of which he had advised the union he disapproved 
bore to the total union budget. 
The U.S. Suprême Court reversed the judgment o£ the Suprême 
Court of Georgia and remanded it to the Court below for proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion.97 
In 1963, in Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Allen,98 the U.S. Su-
prême Court expanded on this décision. It reaffirmed its position that 
Section 2, Eleventh of the Act is to be construed to deny the unions, 
over an employee's objection, the power to use his exacted funds to 
support political causes which he opposes. Further, the Court held that 
it would be impraticable to require a dissenting employée to allège and 
prove each distinct union political expenditure to which he objects; it is 
enough that he manifests his opposition to any political expenditures by 
the union. However, as stated in the Street case the dissent is not to be 
presumed — it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the 
dissenting employée, and no relief may be granted in favour of members 
who fail to make complaints. 
(97) Following the judgment of the U.S. Suprême Court, the unions suggested 
that the pétition should be dismissed because the union ofFered to refund ail dues 
and assessments collected from the complaining employées and, also, the unions 
advised the employées that if they desired to Teave the union they could do so. 
The Georgia Suprême Court [(1961) 43 Labor Cases, para. 17,204] declined to 
give such direction since such action would not hâve protected the complaining 
employées against future action (that is, a dismissal from jobs) by the railroads 
under the union shop contract. Consequently, in compliance with the mandate of 
the U.S. Suprême Court, the Georgia Suprême Court vacated its judgment and 
remanded the case to the lower Court with the directions : ( 1 ) to provide for a 
hearing and the taking of évidence so as to enter a final decree requiring unions 
to give oral testimony and produce documents and records disclosing the sources 
and amounts of money paid to support political causes ; ( 2 ) to exercise gênerai 
équitable discrétion to dérive a fair system of making refunds to employées who 
object to the use by unions of their money for purposes other than collective bar-
gaining ; ( 3 ) to enter a decree granting relief to complaining employées or enjoin 
unions from spending moneys collected from the employées for political purposes ; 
and (4) to notify and allow ail employées of a railroad, who so désire, to intervene 
as the parties' plaintiff. 
The suggested injunction against ail union political expenditures in case of diffi-
culties in devising proportional remédies was criticized on the ground that such 
injunction would be patently unconstitutional. Among the grounds for such a view, 
it was indicated that the suggested injunction would even forbid expenditures in 
state and local élections which are not prohibited by Section 304 of the Taft-
Hartley Act [18 U.S.C. para. 610 (1958)] and would collide with the union's 
constitutional right of political participation. Besides such extrême remedy would 
no doubt be struck down by the Suprême Court as too excessive, and not contem-
plated by the Railway Labor Act. (A. MCALISTER, « Labor, Liberalism and 
Majoritarian Democracy », ibid., pp. 691-692). 
(98) (1963) 47 Labor Cases, para. 18,250; pp. 29,026-29,033. 
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The Court held that an injunction relieving dissenting employées of 
ail obligations to pay the moneys due under the union shop agreement 
is not permissible. Such an injunction would interfère with the union's 
performance of those functions and duties (collective bargaining) which 
the Railway Labor Act placed upon them to attain its goal of stability 
in the industry. The dissenting employées remain obliged, as a condi-
tion of continued employment, to make the payments to their respective 
unions called for by the agreement because their grievance stems from 
the spending of their funds for purposes not authorized by the Act in 
the face of their objection, and not from the enforcement of the union 
shop agreement by the mère collection of funds. 
Further the Court held that in the Street case, the Court had sug-
gested that, among the permissible remédies for dissenting employées, 
were « an injunction against expenditure for political causes opposed by 
each complainting employée of a sum, from those moneys to be spent 
by the union for political purposes, which is so much of the money 
exacted from him as is the proportion of the union's total expenditures 
made for such political activities to the union's total budget », and res-
titution of such a sum already exacted from the complainant and ex-
pended by the union over his objection. This would require a division 
of the union's political expenditures from those germane to collective 
bargaining, since only the former expenditures, to the extent that they 
hâve been made from exacted funds of dissenters, are not authorized by 
the Act. Consequently, it is necessary for the Court to détermine what 
expenditures disclosed by the record are political and what percentage 
of total union expenditures is for political purposes. Since the défendant 
unions posses the facts and records from which the proportion of poli-
tical expenditures to total union expenditures can reasonably be cal-
culated, basic considérations of fairness compel the unions, not the 
individual employées to bear the burden of proving such proportion. 
Then the Court added : 
Absolute précision in the calculation of such proportion is not, of 
course, to be expected or required ; we are mindful of the difficult 
accounting problems that may arise. And no decree would be proper 
which appeared likely to infringe the union's right to expend uniform 
exactions under the unionshop agreement in support of activities 
germane to collective bargaining and, as wéll, to expend nondissenters' 
such exactions in support of political activities. " ( Emphasis added. ) 
(99) Ihid., on page 29,030. 
188 INDUSTBIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 21, No. 2 
Then the Court suggested (1) the form of practical Court decree 
for appropriate relief, and (2) the form of internai union remedy. A 
Court decree would order (1) the refund to a dissenting employée of a 
portion of the exacted funds in the same proportion that union political 
expenditures bear to total expenditures, and (2) a réduction of such 
future exactions from him by the same proportion. 
The Court recognized practical difficulties in reducing the contri-
butions under union shop agreement by a fixed proportion, since the 
proportion of the union budget devoted to political activities may fluc-
tuate. (Then a decree once entered could be modified upon showing 
the changed circumstances). 
However, the difficulties in judicially administered relief should, 
in the opinion of the Court, encourage the unions to consider the adop-
tion by their membership of some voluntary plan by which dissenters 
would be afforded an internai union remedy. At this point, the Court 
referred to the British Trade Union Act of 1913 as re-enarted by the 
Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1946. The Court noted, that 
although the British Act is a législative solution to the problem of dis-
senters* rights, it might be possible for unions to adopt the substantial 
équivalent without législation. The Court stressed that it was not sug-
gested that the British Act provides a perfect model for a plan, that 
would conform with the opinions expressed in the case at bar or in the 
Street case, nor that ail aspects of the British Act are essential, for exam-
ple, the actual ségrégation of political funds, nor that the particular 
boundary drawn by the Act between political expenditures and those 
germane to collective bargaining is necessarily sound. 
Further, the Court noted that one possible solution to the problem 
of fluctuating union political expenditures might be adoption by the 
unions of a proportion calculated on the basis not of présent political 
expenditures but projected future expenditures, so as to anticipate pos-
sible fluctuations, with the dissenting employée free to contract out 
of this proportion of his dues and fées. Alternatively, unions might 
consider actually fixing a percentage ceiling of political expenditures, 
from which proportion dissenters could contract out. 
Finally, the Court added that, if a union agreed upon a formula for 
ascertaining the proportion of political expenditures in its budget, and 
made available a simple procédure for allowing dissenters to be excused 
from having to pay this proportion of moneys due from them under the 
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union shop agreement, prolonged and expensive litigation might well be 
avoided. In an appendix to the judgment, the pertinent portions of the 
1913 British Trade Union Act were set out. 
To complète the picture of the situation in the United States, men-
tion should be made of the Landrum-Griffin Act. 10° This did not 
amend Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, nor did it amend Section 
610 of the U.S. Criminal Code.101 However, Section 501, dealing with 
fiduciary responsibility of officers of labour organizations, provides in 
subsection (a), in part, the following : 
S. 501 (a). The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other représent-
atives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to 
such organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore, the 
duty of each such person, taking into account the spécial problems 
and functions of a labor organization, to hold its money and property 
solely for the benefît of the organization and its members and to 
manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitu-
tion and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted 
thereunder,... 
During the passage of the Act, Congress debated the meaning of 
subsection (a). The issue was raised whether Section 501 (a) would au-
tomatically preclude political contributions and expenditures. 
However, Senator McClellan stated that it was never his idea to 
try to « curb the authority of the members of a union to do whatever 
the members want to do ».102 
In discussing the same Section 501 (a), the then Senator Kennedy 
stated : 
« Section 501 (a) recognizes that the spécial problems and functions 
of a labor organization be taken into considération in determining 
whether union officers and other représentatives are acting responsibly 
in connection with their statutory duties. The problems with which 
labor organizations are accustomed to deal are not limited to bread-
and-butter unionism or to organization and collective bargaining 
(100) Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 («Landrum-
Griffin Act»), 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. ch. 7, sub-chapter II, para. 151-168. 
(101) EJ . FiLLENWARTH, « Politics and Labor Unions », ibid., on p. 193. 
(102) 105 Cong. Rec. 6526 (1959), referred to in E.J. FILLENWARTH, «Politics 
and Labor Unions », ibid., on p. 193. 
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alone, but encompass a broad spectrum of social objectives as the 
union may détermine.1 0 8 
Fillenwarth104 concluded that it appears reasonable to contend 
that Section 501 (a) of the Landrum-Griffin Act should hâve no effect 
whatsoever upon political contributions and expenditures, so long as 
such are approved by the members and officers of a labour union, and 
not otherwise contrary to law. 
A question was raised whether the Court's décision regarding the 
use of union dues for political purposes under the union shop provisions 
of the Railway Labor Act would apply to the similar agreements con-
cluded by the unions covered by the Taft-Hartley Act. The Taft-
Hartley Act expressly granted to the states the right to control or pro-
hibit the union shop (S. 14 (b) ) and the « right-to-work » laws in the 
several states are applicable to employées covered by the Taft-Hartley 
Act. 
In thèse states, no union shop is lawful and there can be no forced 
exaction of union dues. Therefore, it was argued that there could be no 
unlawful expenditures of dues for political purposes in thèse states that 
hâve « right-to-work » législation. Under the Street décision, unions are 
apparently free to make expenditures for politics if members can volun-
tarily join or refuse to join, and under the Court décision in the Allen 
case, in the case of a union shop the expenditures of nondissenters' dues 
for political purposes are lawful. Consequently, it was argued that only 
in the states which permit the union shop can an employée in an indus-
try covered by the Taft-Hartley Act hâve a right of action and the right 
to remédies given by the décisions of the Court under the Railway Labor 
Act. The argument in favour of application of the rulings under the 
Railway Labor Act to similar situations under the Taft-Hartley Act is 
based on the fact that, in the Taft-Hartley Act, there is no express autho-
rization for union political expenditures and there is a similarity between 
the clause in the Taft-Hartley Act which authorizes the union shop 
agreements and the corresponding clause in the Railway Labor Act. On 
the other hand, it was pointed out that, when Congress passed the Taft-
Hartley Act, it was aware that unions used dues for political activities 
and that Congress may hâve intended to limit this activity only to the 
extent of Section 304 of the Act, which made contributions and expendi-
(103) 105 Cong. Rec. on p . 17,900, quoted by E.J. Fillenwarth, ibid., on p. 193. 
(104) E.J. FILLENWARTH, ibid., on. p . 193. 
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tures by unions on behaïf of candidates in fédéral élections a criminal 
offence, and that no other limitations were intended. So, the question 
as to whether the rulings in the Street case and the Allen case would 
apply to the union shop agreements under the Taft-Hartley Act remains 
open to argument. Since the Court's décisions under the Railway Labor 
Act were premised on the législative history of that Act, probably they 
would not be binding in cases involving unions covered by the Taft-
Hartley Act. And this issue will hâve to be settled by the courts on the 
basis of examination of the language and history of the Taft-Hartley Act 
in the same way as in the case of union shop agreements under the 
Railway Labor Act.105 
Canada 
The impact of history and geography on the formation of the 
Canadian national identity has also been felt in the attitude of the 
Canadian trade union movement towards political action. Throughout 
the history of organized labour in Canada, we observe the crosscurrents 
of the American labour tradition of « rewarding friends and punishing 
enemies » within the traditional framework of the two-party System and 
the désire for direct political action by forming a distinctive political 
party on the model of the Labour Party in Great Britain. 
A break with the traditional policies of organized labour of avoiding 
direct political action came when the Canadian Congress of Labour 
(formed in 1940), at its convention in 1943, endorsed the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Fédération (C.C.F.) formed in 1932 as the « political 
arm » of labour. The resolution to this effect read : 
Whereas in the opinion of this Congress, the policy and programme 
of the C.C.F. more adequately expresses the views of organized labour 
than any other party : 
Be it therefore resolved that this Convention of the C.C.L. endorse 
the C.C.F. as the political arm of Labour in Canada, an recommend 
to ail affiliated and chartered unions that they affiliate with the 
C.C.F.106 
(105) JAMES PARSONS, « Labor Law — Employee's Right not to support Political 
Candidates and Causes he opposes under Union Shop Agreements Authorized by 
Railway Labor Act», The American University Law Review, (1963) Vol 13, 
pp. 104-108, on pp. 107-8 ; « Union Shop Provision of the Railway Labor Act 
held not to Authorize use of Union Dues for Political Purposes », Columhia Law 
Review, Vol. 61 (1961), pp. 1513-1518, on p. 1518. 
(106) H.A. LOGAN, Trade Unions in Canada, Toronto, the Macmillan Co. of C. 
Ltd., 1948, p. 555. 
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The endorsement of the C.C.F. as the « political arm of Labour » 
was reaffirmed at each C.C.L. convention until the formation of the 
Canadian Labour Congress (C.L.C.) in 1956.107 
In 1958, the C.L.C. convention in Winnipeg adopted the historié re-
solution to work for the formation of a broadly based political movement 
in concert with the Co-operative Commonwealth Fédération (C.C.F.), 
other sections of the labour movement, farm organizations, professional 
people and other liberally minded persons interested in basic social re-
form and reconstruction through the parliamentary system of govern-
m e n t 1 M 
After the 1958 convention, the C.L.C. played an important rôle 
in the formation of the New Démocratie Party which came into being 
at the founding convention in 1961. The Congress, however, did not 
affiliate itself with the party, but encouraged its members to partici-
pate actively in the affairs of the N.D.P. and urged the unions affiliated 
with the C.L.C. to affiliate with the N.D.P.109 
The constitution of the N.D.P. provides for two kinds of member-
ship : individual and affiliated. The affiliated membership is open to 
trade unions, farm groups, co-operatives, women's organizations and 
other organizations. The per capita membership fee for affiliated or-
ganizations is five cents per member per month. n o 
The national convention which formed the New Démocratie Party 
took place between July 31 and August 4, 1961. A few months earlier, 
in March 1961, the British Columbia Labour Relations Act Amendment 
A c t i n came into effect, which made a number of amendments to the 
provisions of the B.C. Labour Relations Act.112 Among them was a 
new subsection (6) of Section 9. 
(107)EAMON PARK, « Labour's Political Diary », Canadian Labour, Vol. 6, No. 9, 
Sept. 1961, p. 21. 
(108) STANLEY KNOWLES, The New Party, McClelland and Stewart Limited, 
1961, pp. 19-20, 33, 127. 
(109) CLAUDE JODOIN, «The C.L.C. and Politics », Canadian Labour, Vol. 6, 
No. 9, Sept. 1961, pp. 5-7 (Excerpts from the address of the C.L.C. président to 
the founding convention of the New Démocratie Party, Ottawa, July 31, 1961). 
(110) The Fédéral Constitution of the New Démocratie Party, Article II, 
Article III, S. 2 (1). 
(111) 1961 (B.C.) c. 31. 
(112) R.S. B.C. 1960, c. 205. 
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Section 9 of the B.C. Labour Relations Act contains provisions re-
garding check-off of union dues. Subsection (1) provides that every 
employer shall honour a written assignment of wages to a trade union 
certified under the Act, except where the assignment is declared null 
and void by a judge or is revoked by the assignor. Subsection (2) sets 
out the form of the assignment for the purpose of securing to the union 
payment of initiation fées and membership dues. Subsection (3) pro-
vides for the remission each month by the employer to the union of the 
fées and dues deducted. 
The new subsection (6) reads as follows : 
S. 9 (6) (a) No employer and no one acting on behalf of an 
employer shall refuse to employ or to continue to employ a person and 
no one shall discriminate against a person in regard to employment 
only because that person refuses to make a contribution or expend-
iture to or on behalf of any political party or to or on behalf of a 
candidate for political office. 
(b) No trade-union and no person acting on behalf of a trade-union 
shall refuse membership to or refuse to continue membership of a 
person in a trade union, and no one shall discriminate against a person 
in regard to membership in a trade-union or in regard to employment 
only because that person refuses to make or makes a contribution or 
expenditure, directly or indirectly, to or on behalf of any political 
party or to or on behalf of a candidate for political office. 
(c) (i) No trade-union and no person action on behalf of a trade-
union shall directly or indirectly contribute to or expend on behalf of 
any political party or to or on behalf of any candidate for political 
office any moneys deducted from an employées wages under sub-
section (1) or a collective agreementt or paid as a condition of member-
ship in the trade-union. 
( ii ) Rémunération of a member of a trade-union for his services in an 
officiai union position held by him while seeldng élection or upon 
being elected to public office is not a violation of this clause. 
(d) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act or the provisions 
of any collective agreement, unless the trade-union delivers to the 
employer who is in receipt of an assignment under subsection (1) 
or who is party to a collective agreement, a statutory déclaration, 
made by an officer duly authorized in that behalf, that the trade-
union is complying with and will continue to comply with clause (c) 
during the term of the assignment or during the term of the collective 
agreement, neither the employer nor a person acting on behalf 
of the employer shall make any déduction whatsoever from the wages 
of an employée on behalf of the trade-union. 
194 INDUSTMAL RELATIONS, VOL. 21, No. £ 
(e) Any moneys deducted from the wages of an employée and paid 
to a trade-union that does not comply with this subsection are the 
property of the employée, and the trade-union is liable to the employée 
for any moneys so deducted. (Emphasis added.) 
The prohibition contained in S. 9 (6) (c) (i) is framed in the widest 
terms and does not leave any loop-holes. It applies to fédéral as well 
as provincial politics. A trade union cannot use, either directly or indi-
rectly, to support a political party or a candidate for political office, any 
union dues or initiation fées collected from an employée either under 
statutory check-off assignment, or under check-off arrangement in a 
collective agreement, or paid as a condition of membership in a trade 
union, whether or not there is a check-off. The provisions contained in 
clauses (d) and (e) of subsection (6) are ancillary and are designed to 
secure obédience to the prohibition contained in clause (c).11S 
Another province which enacted provisions restricting the use of 
union dues for political purposes is Prince Edward Island. The Indus-
trial Relations Act of 1962 114 contains such a provision in the part of 
the Act dealing with check-off of union dues. 
Section 48, in subsection (1), provides that the parties to a collective 
agreement may include in the agreement a provision for check-off of 
union dues. 
Subsection (2) provides that, where there is no provision for check-
off in the collective agreement, such déductions shall be made by the 
employer only 
a) if the officers of such trade union duly authorized by its mem-
bers make application to the Minister of Labour for the taking 
of a vote to ascertain the wishes of the employées of such indus-
try in respect of such déductions; and 
b) if, upon a vote taken by a ballot at the times and under condi-
tions fixed by the Minister of Labour, a majority of the em-
ployées in the unit vote in favour of the making of such déduc-
tions; and 
c) if the individual employée being a member of such trade union 
makes to the employer a signed written request that such de-
(113) JUDSON, J. (1964) 41 D.L.R. (2d), on p. 19. 
(114) 1962, Ch. 18. 
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ductions be made from the wages due to him, indicating the 
name of the person to whom such déductions shall be paid. 
Paragraph (d) provides that any written request made by the em-
ployée under subsection (c) may not be revoked within six months from 
the date thereof. 
Subsection (3) provides : 
( 3 ) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) 
hereof, no employer shall be required to deduct any amount which 
the employée, or the trade union, shall hâve assigned to the support 
of, or to be paid to, any political party, and any written authorization 
for déduction to be filed by the employée with the employer shall 
certify that no part of the amount required to be deducted shall be 
used by him, or by the trade union, for that purpose. 
It would appear from the wording of subsection (3) that, when the 
check-off is operating under provision of a collective agreement (sub-
section (1) ) the employer is not bound to deduct that part of union 
dues of an employée which the employée or the trade union assigned to 
the support of, or to be paid to, any political party. 
The second part of subsection (3) seems to be concerned with the 
situation where union dues are deducted by the employer under sub-
section (2), that is, upon a written authorization filed by the employée 
with an employer. Unless such authorization contains a déclaration 
that no part of the deducted dues shall be used for the support of poli-
tical parties, such authorization is ineffective. 
It would seem that, in Prince Edward Island, the prohibition with 
regard to the use of union dues for political purposes is restricted only 
to the dues collected through the check-off arrangement, whether sta-
tutory or under collective agreement; otherwise, the prohibition does not 
apply. 
The prohibition under the P.E.I. législation does not go as far as 
the prohibition under the Labour Relations Act in British Golumbia. 
Under the latter Act, political contributions are prohibited from moneys 
derived not only from the check-off, but also from moneys paid as a 
condition of membership, whether or not there is a check-off; the B.C. 
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Act only allows a voluntary collection for political purposes made out-
side the machinery of the Act and the collective agreement.115 
The British Columbia législation, prohibiting the use of union dues 
to support political parties or candidates for political office, was chal-
lenged in the courts in OU, Chemical and Atomic Workers International 
Union, Local 16-601 v. Impérial Oil Limited 118 on the issue of consti-
tutionality. 
The circumstances of the dispute were as follows : 
By the ternis of the collective agreement between Local 16-601 and 
Impérial Oil Limited, the Company was obliged to make monthly wage 
déductions of union fées and membership dues. When the union re-
fused to give the statutory déclaration required by Section 9 (6) (d) of 
the Act, the employer in turn declined to make the wage déductions. 
The union thereupon brought action for spécifie performance of the 
check-off clause of the collective agreement and a déclaration that it 
was not within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Législature to enact the 
prohibitive measures contained in subsection 6. 
Under the Canadian Constitution, the Parliament of Canada and 
provincial Législatures are sovereign, within the limits of subject and 
area assigned to them by the British North America Acts (save that the 
Dominion Government can dis allô w any provincial Act within one year). 
The union's challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 9 (6) (c) 
of the Labour Relations Act was therefore based on the contention that 
subsection 6 (c) was beyond the powers of the British Columbia légis-
lature. 
Mr. Justice Whittaker of the B.C. Suprême Court upheld the cons-
titutional validity of the subsection. He ruled that it was intra vires 
as being législation relating to property and civil rights in British Colum-
bia under Section 92 (13) of the B.N.A. Aet.117 
(117) Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 16-601 v. 
Impérial Oil Limited ( 1961 ) 36 W.W.R., Part 9, p. 385. 
(115) JUDSON, J. (1964) 41 D.L.R. (2d), on p. 17. 
(116) (1961) 36 WWR, Part 9, p. 385; (1962) 33 DLR (2d) 732; (1964) 
41 DLR (2d) p. 1. 
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This décision was affirmed by the unanimous judgment of the 
Court of Appeal of British Columbia.118 From that judgment, the 
union appealed to the Suprême Court of Canada.119 
The Suprême Court of Canada, by a majority of four to three, dis-
missed the union appeal and upheld the constitutional validity of Section 
9 (6) (c) on the same ground as the courts below, that the impugned 
législation was valid provincial législation in relation to property and 
civil rights. In some respects, the stand taken by the Suprême Court of 
Canada resembled that of the United States courts, in some ways it 
differed. 
THE ISSUE OF OONSTITUTIONALITY 
Basic constitutional issues were différent. The Constitution of the 
United States contains the Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments), 
which guarantees basic civil liberties and prohibits any législation or 
action on the part of fédéral or state authorities that would infringe 
on, inter alla, freedom of religion, speech, of the press and of assembly. 
The Suprême Court of the United States, being the suprême guardian 
and interpréter of the Constitution, may déclare any fédéral or state 
législation unconstitutional as being contrary to the Bill of Rights. 
The British North America Act does not contain a Bill of Rights 
or any explicit guarantees of civil liberties. As already noted, Parlia-
ment and the Législatures are sovereign within their sphères. Nothing 
is beyond the reach of one or the other (or both together).120 Whatever 
freedoms Canadians enjoy may be reinforced or reduced, or even taken 
away by Parliament or the provincial Législatures.121 
(118) OU, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 16-601 v. 
Impérial OU Ltd. and Attorney-General of British Columbia (1962) 33 D.L.R. 
(2d) p. 732. 
(119) OU, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. Impérial OU Ltd. 
(1964) 41 D.L.R. (2d) p. 1. 
(120) See BORA LASKTN, Canadian Constitutional Law, Second Edition, The 
Carswell Company Ltd., 1960, on pp. 938-944. 
(121) A dissent from this doctrine of absolute législative supremacy was stated 
by Mr. Justice Abbott in Switzman v. Elbling [(1957) 7 D.L.R. (2d), 337] where 
he stated, at p. 371 : 
. . . the Canadian constitution being declared to be similar in principle to that of 
the United Kingdom, I am also of opinion that as our constitutional Act now stands, 
Parliament itself could not abrogate this right of discussion and debate. The power 
of Parliament to limit it is, in my view, restricted to such powers as may be 
exercisable under its exclusive législative jurisdiction with respect to criminal law 
and to make laws for the peace, order and good Government of the nation. 
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« Property and civil rights in the Province » were assigned to the 
provincial Législatures. But there is judicial controversy over just what 
« civil rights » covers. Some judges hâve said that the terni does not 
include freedom of worship or freedom of speech, and that such matters 
are within the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.122 
So the issue the Canadian courts had to décide in OU, Chemical 
and Atomic Workers International Union, 16-601 v. Impérial OU Limited, 
was whether the prohibitive clauses contained in the B.C. Labour 
Relations Act were intra vires. 
The union claimed that the impugned législation was ultra vires 
because it related to the subject of fédéral élections and curtailed the 
fundamental rights of Canadian citizens, which are essential to the 
proper functioning of parliamentary institutions; and because the légis-
lation affected the political activity of trade unions and the right to 
curtail such activities was beyond the powers of a provincial Législa-
ture. 
On the other hand, the Attorney-General of British Columbia 
argued that the législation limits only the power to use certain specified 
funds for particular purposes; that this limitation is valid législation in 
respect of the field of labour relations and the Législature of British 
Columbia has the authority to enact such législation as property and 
civil rights in the province. 
The majority of the Suprême Court of Canada like the courts below, 
held that Section 9 (6) (c) was intra vires, as being législation in relation 
to civil rights of individual employées. The main grounds for this 
décision were as follows : In the décision in the case of Toronto Electric 
Commissioners v. Snider (1925) 2 D.L.R. 5, (1925) A.C. 396, it was 
established beyond doubt that the field of législation in relation to 
labour relations in a province is within the sphère of provincial légis-
lative jurisdiction coming under Section 92 (13) — Property and Civil 
Rights in the Province.123 Under the Labour Relations Act, a certified 
trade union is a bargaining agent for ail employées in a defined unit 
(123) Except for works, undertakings or business within the législative authority 
of the Parliament of Canada. 
(122) Re Alberta Législation (1938) 4 D.L.R. 433; Saumur v. City of Québec 
and Attorney-General of Québec (1953) 4 D.L.R. 641 ; Switzman v. Elbling (1957) 
7 D.L.R. (2d), 337. 
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and may, through a collective agreement, compel contributions to its 
funds by employées who are not members (the Rand Formula), and may 
even make membership in a union a condition of employment. In the 
opinion of the majority of the Court, the Législature which has granted 
the right of check-off to a union under Section 9 (1) of the Labour 
Relations Act, may limit it as it has done under Section 9 (6) (c) and 
may equally limit the effect and use of a check-off under a collective 
agreement. As Mr. Justice Martland stated : 
The Labour Relations Act has materially affected the civil rights of 
individual employées by conferring upon certified trade unions the 
power to bind them by agreement and the power to make agreements 
which compel membership in a union. Such législation falls within 
the powers of the Législature of the Province of British Columbia to 
enact, as being labour législation, and, therefore, relating to property 
and civil rights in the Province. The législation which is under attack 
in the présent proceedings, in my opinion, does nothing more than to 
provide that the fee paid as a condition of membership in such an 
entity by each individual employée cannot be expended for a political 
object which may not command his support. That individual has 
been brought into association with the trade union by statutory require-
ment. The same Législature which requires this can protect his civil 
rights by providing that he cannot be compelled to assist in the 
financial promotion of political causes with which he disagrees. Such 
législation is, in pith and substance, législation in respect of civil 
rights in the Province. 124 
Mr. Justice Ritchie expressed similar views and added that, even if 
it could be said that Section 9 (6) (c), (d) had any effect on political 
élections, the effect could only be incidental and would not alter the 
character of such provisions as being in relation to labour relations and 
not in relation to fédéral or provincial élections.125 
Mr. Justice Judson, in his dissenting opinion, held that the ques-
tioned clauses do not fall within the fieîd of labour relations but are in 
relation to the political activity of trade unions and that the subject mat-
ter of the impugned législation concerns political and constitutional rights, 
not property and civil rights. Further, he added that, in his opinion, it 
would be a grave and unwarranted extension of principle to hold that 
the décision in Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, supra, enables 
the Province to control and curtail the political contributions of the 
(124) OU, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v; Impérial OU 
Ltd. (1964) 41 D.L.R. (2d) 1, on pp. 11-12. 
(125) lbid.y on pp. 22-23. 
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trade unions. Any such extension, in his view, would be in direct con-
flict with the fundamental bases of the décision of the Suprême Court in 
Switzman v. Elbling,126 (1957) 7 D.L.R. (2d) 337, where ail the judges, 
in the majority, were of the opinion that the législation there in question 
was outside the provincial power. Five members of the Court held that 
it was outside the provincial power because it was législation in relation 
to criminal law. Three judges held that it was not within any of the 
powers specifically assigned to the Provinces and that it constituted an 
unjustifiable interférence with freedom of speech and expression essen-
tial under the démocratie form of government established in Canada. 
Further, Mr. Justice Judson held that the législation in question is 
directly related to élections, including fédéral élections, and that the 
Provincial Législature has no power to restrict the right of any person 
or organization within the province to make contributions at fédéral 
élections and to fédéral candidates.127 
Mr. Justice Abbott, in his dissenting opinion, stated that the pur-
pose of Section 9 (6) (c) is to prohibit political contributions made direc-
tly or indirectly by one class of voluntary organization — a trade union — 
out of moneys received as a condition of membership, whether or not 
there is a check-off. In his view, such législation cannot be supported 
as being in relation to property and civil rights in the Province, nor 
can it be said to be in relation to matters of a merely local or private 
nature in the Province.128 
THE ISSUE OF THE NATURE OF TRADE UNIONS 
Another issue considered by the Suprême Court of Canada and by 
the courts in the United States in connection with union expenditure for 
the political purposes, was whether a trade union has complète auto-
nomy in disposition of its funds, or whether such autonomy could be 
curtailed by statutory provisions. In other words, is a trade union a pri-
vate organization with complète autonomy of action or is it basically a 
création of statute, endowed with statutory rights and obligations for 
the purpose of performing, as a sort of governmental agency, certain 
spécifie aims of governmental policy? 
( 126 ) In this décision, the Suprême Court of Canada ruled ultra vires the Québec 
Communistic Propaganda Act (An Act to Protect the Province against Communistic 
Propagande), R.S.Q. 1941, ch. 52. 
(127) OU, Chemical ... Ibid., on pp. 18, 19, 20. 
(128) Ibid., on p. 5. 
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The position taken in this respect by the Suprême Court of Canada 
and the courts in the United States was basically the same — that trade 
unions are not entirely autonomous organizations, but act within a statu-
tory framework designed to make them perform a definite aim of govern-
mental policy, namely to secure industrial peace. 
Their purpose is to stabilize industrial relations through the machi-
nery of collective bargaining. A trade union is able to fulfil its social 
fonction by becoming a bargaining agent for the unit of employées who 
are not ail members of the union. Under statutory provisions, the 
unions are able to enter into agreements with regard to union security, 
such as union shop or check-off of union dues. If the membership in 
the union is not entirely free, but could be imposed as a condition of 
employment, then the union cannot claim complète autonomy as to the 
disposition of funds exacted from union members as a condition of em-
ployment, and the state, through législative measures, or the courts in 
interpreting law, may impose some limitations as to the use of the 
exacted funds and provide some safeguards for the rights of the dis-
senting minorities. 
Mr. Justice Black of the U.S. Suprême Court, in the Street case, 
supra, in his dissenting opinion, noted that a union or other private 
group may spend its money for political causes if its members voluntarily 
join it and can voluntarily get out of it. Then the dissenter has no right 
except to disagree with the majority and to leave the organization if 
he wishes to do so. But the situation is différent « when a fédéral law 
steps in and authorizes such a group to carry on activities at the expense 
of persons who do not choose to be members of the group as well as 
those who do ».129 Then such a law cannot be used in a way that 
abridges the specifically defined freedoms of the First Amendment. 
Further, he stated : 
Unions composed of a voluntary membership, like ail other voluntary 
groups, should be free in this country to fight in the public forum 
to advance their own causes, to promote their choice of candidates 
and parties and to work for the doctrines or the laws they favor. 
But to the extent that Government steps in to force people to help 
espouse the particular causes of a group, that group — whether com-
posed of railroad workers or lawyers — loses its status as a voluntary 
group.1S0 
(129) Machinists v. Street, ibid., on p. 24,687. 
(130) Ibid., on p. 24,690. 
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It is sig;nificant that Mr. Justice Martland of the Suprême Court 
of Canada, when considering the objects of the B.C. Labour Relations 
Act, quoted Mr. Justice MacDonald who, in Re Labour Relations Board 
(N.S.) (1952) 3 D.L.R. 42, stated at pp. 57-8 the following : 
To my mind the object of the Act is to facilitate collective bargaining 
and stabilize industrial relations by enabling a union to establish 
before the Board its ability to represent a group of employées ; and, 
with this controversial question settled, to require the employer, upon 
notice from the union, to negotiate with it and (with the aid of 
conciliation services ), to promote the conclusion of an agreement which 
shall be legally enforceable ; and generally to ensure a greater measure 
of industriel peace to the public. Certification is, of course, not neces-
saary for collective bargaining, but the policy of the Act undouhtedly 
is to promote it as a means to more orderly bargaining. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
Further, Mr. Justice Martland noted that the instrument for collec-
tive bargaining is a trade union as defined in the Act and the primary 
purpose of the Act is, therefore, « to spell out the respective rights and 
obligations of the employer, the employée and the certified trade union, 
each of which is subject to its mandatory powers. » 131 
Finally, Mr. Justice Martland stressed the fact that, as the resuit of 
the Suprême Court décision in the Therien case, a trade union, when it 
becomes certified as a bargaining agent, becomes a légal entity. And 
when the Législature clothes that entity with wide powers for the 
exaction of membership fées, by methods which previously it did not, in 
law, possess, it can set limits to the objects for which funds so obtained 
may be applied.182 
The implication of this statement is clear : that a trade union, being 
a légal entity with rights and obligations defined by the statutes and 
with membership that may be enforced, is not a private organization 
and cannot claim complète autonomy regarding the management and 
spending of its income, particularly in connection with the spending of 
funds collected from the exacted dues. 
THE ISSUE OF THE KIGHT OF THE UNIONS TO POLITICAL AcmvriTES 
The Suprême Court of Canada (as the courts in the United States) 
upheld the union right to political activity and to support f inancially 
political causes. 
(131) OU, Chemical ... Ibid., on p. 9 (emphasis added). 
(132) Ibid., on p. 13. 
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Mr. Justice Martland, expressing the views of the majority, stressed 
the fact that the impugned législation did not affect the right of indivi-
dual union members to engage in any form of political activity. He 
also emphasized that the législation does not prevent a trade union as 
such from engaging in political activities. It does not prevent a trade 
union from soliciting funds from its members for political purposes, or 
limit in any way, the expenditure of funds so raised. Also, he stressed 
that the législation does not prevent the use of funds, which are obtained 
in particular ways, from being used for political purposes. He pointed 
out that the issue before the Court was not the right to engage in politi-
cal activity but the right to use funds obtained through the check-off or 
as a condition of membership in a trade union for the support of a 
political party or candidate. He added : 
A trade union, when it becomes certified as a bargaining agent, be-
comes a légal entity (International Brotherhood of Teamster* et al. 
v. Therien, 22 D.L.R. (2d) 1, [1960] S.C.R. 265). When the Légis-
lature clothes that entity with wide powera for the exaction of mem-
bership fées, by methods which previously it did not, in law, possess, 
it caa set limits to the objects for which funds so obtained may be 
applied. Législation of this kind is not in my view, a substantial 
interférence with the worldng of parliamentary institutions. 1M 
The majority of the Suprême Court concurred with Mr. Justice 
Martland that the Législature which has by statute brought employées 
into association with a trade union may protect their civil rights by 
forbidding their compelled assistance in the promotion of political cau-
ses with which they may disagree, and therefore may forbid use for 
political purposes of money paid as a condition of membership in the 
union. 
THE ISSUE OF THE MAJORITY RIGHTS VERSUS 
THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS 
One of the basic issues facing a démocratie society is the relation-
ship of the individual to the group; the problem of reconciling the au-
thority and corporate interests of the group with the dignity and sepa-
rate personality of individuals. Democracy is the System of majority 
rule and minority rights, and to maintain necessary balance between 
them seems to be the very essence of a démocratie society. The need 
for reconciling the competing interests of the individual and the group 
(133) Ibid., p. 13. 
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is a problem of the utmost importance in the area of union political 
activity. The question is, can the political rights of both the union majo-
rity and its dissenting minority be honoured simultaneously? 184 
In the United States, the judges of the Suprême Court, in the cases 
discussed above, felt the necessity of reconciling the rights of minorities 
with the will of the majority. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissenting 
opinion in U.S. v. U.A.W., supra, questioning the constitutionality of 
Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, expressed the view that the unions 
operate under the rule of the majority and, if there is a need to protect 
the rights of the minority, this should not be done by « burning down 
the house to roast the pig ». « If minorities », he added, « need pro-
tection against the use of union funds for political speech-making, there 
are ways of reaching that end without denying the majority their First 
Amendment rights ».1S5 At this point, Mr. Justice Douglas referred to 
the British System of « contracting out ». 
In the Street case, supra, where the Court was concerned with the 
protection of minority rights under union shop agreements, Mr. Justice 
Brennan, in rendering the judgment for the majority, also expressed 
concern for the rights of majorities. He stated : 
For the majority also has an interest in stating its views without 
being silenced by the dissenters. To attain the appropriate recon-
ciliation between majority and dissenting interests in the area of 
political expression, we think the courts in adrninistering the Act 
should sélect remédies which protect both interests to the maximum 
extent possible without undue impingement of one on the other.138 
The Court sought to reconcile the rights of majorities with the 
protection of minorities by applying the British System of « contracting 
out ». 
The ban on the use of union dues for political purposes contained 
in Section 9 (6) (c) of the B.C. Labour Relations Act is absolute. Appa-
rently, in order to protect the rights of individuals not to be forced to 
contribute to political parties or causes that they may disapprove of, the 
législation disregarded the rights of the majority that might be in favour 
(134) AJUSTER MCALISTER, « Labor, Liberalism and Majoritarian Democracy », 
Ibid., on p. 661. 
(135) U.S. v. U.A.W., Ibid., p. 93,454. 
(136) International Association of Machinists v. Street, Ibid., on p. 24,680. 
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of such contributions. The aim of the législation to protect individual 
rights of dissenting minorities was stressed before the Suprême Court 
of Canada in the arguments presented in support of it. The same soli-
citude for the rights of dissenting minorities not to be forced to support 
political causes which they may disapprove of was voiced in the majo-
rity ruling of the Court. However, the basic weakness of the législation 
in question is the absence of concern for the rights of the majority and 
the unwillingness on the part of the legislator to provide for a reasonable 
compromise which would secure the legitimate rights of the majority 
while proteoting at the same rime the rights of the dissenting minorities. 
To sum up, the situation in Canada in relation to the prohibition of 
use of union dues for political purposes is as follows : 
Out of eleven jurisdictions (fédéral and ten provinces) only British 
Columbia and Prince Edward Island enacted prohibitive measures in 
this matter. The prohibition contained in the Prince Edward Island 
Industrial Relations Act of 1962 seems to be restricted to preventing 
the use for political purposes only of the union dues collected through 
check-off arrangement, whether by statute or by collective agreement. 
On the other hand, in British Columbia, the prohibition contained 
in the 1961 amendment to the Labour Relations Act on the use of union 
dues for political purposes is total and applies to ail union dues and ini-
tiation fées whether collected through the check-off or paid directly to 
the union as a condition of membership. The prohibition applies to 
fédéral and provincial politics. The only money the unions may expend 
for political purposes is that obtained from union income other than 
union dues, or money collected from union members on a voluntary 
basis. 
COTISATIONS SYNDICALES ET CONTRIBUTIONS POUR FINS 
POLITIQUES — COMPARAISON ENTRE LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE, 
LES ÉTATS-UNIS ET LE CANADA 
GRANDE-BRETAGNE 
Par la décision qu'elle a rendue dans la cause Osborne (1910) , la Chambre 
des Lords de Grande-Bretagne refusait aux syndicats ouvriers le droit de faire 
de la politique, d'appuyer financièrement les députés au Parlement et les candidats 
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aux élections législatives et à d'autres charges publiques. La Chambre des Lords 
s'est surtout fondée sur les deux raisons suivantes pour rendre sa décision : 
( a ) une interprétation stricte de la définition de l'expression « syndicat ouvrier » 
apparaissant dans la Loi de 1876 sur les syndicats ouvriers (Trade Union Act) , où 
l'on ne mentionne pas l'action politique comme un des buts des syndicats ouvriers ; 
( b ) la protection des droits des syndiqués dissidents que la majorité ne peut pas 
obliger à appuyer financièrement des causes politiques qu'ils n'endosseraient pas. 
Cette interdiction fut levée avec l'adoption de la Loi de 1913 sur les syndicats 
ouvriers. Cette loi permettait aux syndicats d'ajouter l'action politique aux buts 
des syndicats prévus dans la loi et contenait une disposition relative à la 
création d'une caisse d'action politique afin d'aider financièrement les députés au 
Parlement et les candidats aux élections législatives et à d'autres charges publiques. 
On sauvegardait les droits des minorités dissidentes avec la formule dite « con-
tracting out ». Tout adhérent en désaccord avec les buts politiques de la majorité 
pouvait être exempté de contribuer au fonds politique du syndicat au moyen d'un 
avis d'exemption. En 1927, on vota la Loi sur les conflits du travail et les syndicats 
ouvriers dans laquelle la formule « contracting out » était remplacée par la Formule 
« contracting in ». Selon cette dernière formule, il était interdit à tout syndicat 
d'exiger des contributions pour fins politiques, à moins que l'adhérent ne consente 
par écrit à les verser, même dans le cas où les buts politiques et les règles relatives 
à la caisse d'action politique du syndicat avaient été adoptés par la majorité. 
La loi de 1946 sur les conflits du travail et les syndicats ouvriers abrogeait 
la loi de 1927, de sorte que les dispositions de la loi de 1913 étaient rétablies inté-
gralement et la procédure « contracting out » était réintroduite. 
ETATS-UNIS 
La Loi Taft-Hartley 
En vertu de l'article 304 de la Loi Taft-Hartley (qui a été inséré plus tard 
dans le Code criminel des Etats-Unis à l'article 610) , il devenait illégal pour les 
entreprises et les syndicats ouvriers de verser des contributions ou de faire des 
dépenses concernant les élections fédérales. Cette interdiction vise les élections 
présidentielles et vice-présidentielles, l'élection des sénateurs, des députés, des 
délégués ou commissaires résidants du Congrès, les élections primaires, les congrès 
et les réunions politiques. On exprime des doutes sur la validité constitutionnelle 
de cette disposition ; on prétend qu'elle enfreint la garantie constitutionnelle de la 
liberté d'expression et de la presse, contenue dans le Premier amendement de la 
Constitution des Etats-Unis. 
Les tribunaux ont statué que les interdictions contenues dans l'article 304 ne 
visaient que les caisses syndicales, désignées sous le nom de caisses générales, qui 
sont alimentées par les cotisations syndicales, normales et spéciales, et ne s'appli-
quaient pas aux contributions volontaires recueillies chez les adhérents pour des 
fins politiques, en sus des cotisations syndicales normales. 
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En plus, les tribunaux ont décidé qu'il était légal d'utiliser les fonds des caisses 
générales pour les fins suivantes : 
a) donner un appui aux candidats aux élections fédérales dans les périodiques 
réguliers des syndicats distribués principalement aux adhérents ; 
h) faire de la publicité dans les journaux, à la radio, à la télévision, dans le 
cas de petits syndicats locaux qui ne distribuent pas de journal à leurs 
adhérents, pour appuyer certains candidats ou s'y opposer, à la condition 
que ces moyens de communications soient la façon normale pour le syndi-
cat de faire connaître ses avis aux adhérents mais à la condition que ces 
dépenses soient dûment autorisées et votées par les membres ; 
c) faire inscrire des votants ou les transporter aux bureaux de scrutin le jour 
des élections. 
De plus, il a été décidé que les dépenses de caractère politique étaient légales 
lorsque les sommes utilisées avaient été autorisées volontairement par les adhérents 
qui permettaient qu'on utilise une certaine fraction des cotisations pour des fins 
politiques. 
La Loi concernant les cheminots (Railway Labor Ad) 
Les tribunaux des Etats-Unis ont été saisis du problème de la protection des 
droits des minorités dissidentes surtout au sujet des conventions qui, conclues en 
vertu de la Loi concernant les cheminots, imposent au travailleur l'obligation d'adhé-
rer à un syndicat dans un certain délai. Le paragraphe 11, article 2, de la Loi 
prévoit qu'un transporteur et un syndicat ouvrier peuvent conclure une convention 
collective obligeant tous les employés à adhérer au syndicat dans un délai spécifié. 
Le paragraphe 11, de l'article 2, soulevait au fond deux questions, à savoir : 
(1) si les clauses de sécurité syndicale relatives à l'obligation d'adhérer à un syndi-
cat après un certain délai étaient constitutionnellement valides; (2) si les cotisa-
tions prélevées en vertu des conventions prévoyant cette obligation pouvaient être 
utilisées par le syndicat pour des fins politiques ou des causes auxquelles certains 
adhérents pourraient s'opposer. La Cour suprême des Etats-Unis a soutenu la 
validité constitutionnelle du paragraphe 11, de l'article 2, comme étant pour le 
Congrès un exercice régulier des pouvoirs que lui confère la Clause sur le commerce. 
La Cour a aussi soutenu que les dispositions de la loi concernant l'obligation d'adhérer 
n'enfreignaient pas le droit qu'ont les employés, selon la Constitution, à la liberté 
de conscience, d'association ou d'opinion. 
En ce qui a trait à la question de savoir si les cotisations syndicales prélevées 
en vertu des dispositions relatives à l'adhésion obligatoire à un syndicat pourraient 
être utilisées pour des fins politiques, la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis a décidé 
que les syndicats ont droit de faire de la politique et qu'ils ont droit d'utiliser pour 
fins politiques les cotisations syndicales versées par les adhérents qui ne s'opposent 
pas d'une façon expresse à cette utilisation. Par contre, afin de sauvegarder les droits 
des dissidents, la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis a décidé qu'on devait remettre, 
aux dissidents qui s'opposent d'une façon expresse à cet usage, la fraction de leurs 
cotisations qui servirait aux fins mentionnées et qu'on devait par la suite déduire 
cette fraction de leurs cotisations. En outre, la Cour suprême a suggéré aux syndi-
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cats, en attendant l'adoption d'une loi concernant cette question, de mettre en 
vigueur un système volontaire d'un genre « contracting out » semblable à celui qui 
existe en Grande-Bretagne en vertu de la Loi des syndicats ouvriers (1913) . 
CANADA 
I 
En 1961 était votée la Loi modificatrice de la loi de la Colombie-Britannique 
sur les relations ouvrières où figurent un certain nombre de modifications de la 
Loi de la Colombie-Britannique sur les relations ouvrières. Parmi ces modifications, 
il y en a une qui stipule qu'un syndicat ouvrier ne peut utiliser, ni directement ni 
indirectement, pour appuyer un parti politique ou un candidat à une charge publi-
que, toute cotisation syndicale ou droit d'initiation obtenus d'un travailleur, soit 
par un précompte conforme aux statuts ou par un précompte prévu dans une con-
vention collective, soit comme versement nécessaire pour pouvoir adhérer à un 
syndicat ouvrier, qu'il y ait eu ou non précompte. Cette interdiction vise la politique 
fédérale autant que la politique provinciale. 
Dans n i e du Prince-Edouard, la Loi de 1962 sur les relations industrielles 
contient des dispositions restreignant l'utilisation des cotisations syndicales à des 
fins politiques. Cependant, il semble que cette restriction n'aille pas aussi loin que 
celle que pose la Loi de la Colombie-Britannique sur les relations industrielles et 
qu'elle se limite au cas des cotisations retenues par précompte, soit statutaire, soit 
en vertu d'une convention collective ; dans les autres cas l'interdiction ne s'applique 
pas. 
La législation de la Colombie-Britannique interdisant l'usage des cotisations 
syndicales pour appuyer un parti politique ou un candidat à une charge publique, 
a été remise en question dans la cause Syndicat international des travailhurs des 
industries pétrolières, chimique et atomique, local 16-601, v. Impérial OU Limited 
pour la raison que ladite législation aurait dépassé les pouvoirs de la législature 
de la Colombie-Britannique. Les tribunaux (y compris la Cour suprême du Canada) 
ont décidé que l'interdiction était dans la limite des statuts puisque cette législation 
concerne la propriété et les droits civils en Colombie-Britannique en vertu de 
l'article 92(13) de l'Acte A.B.N. 
La Cour suprême du Canada a examiné un autre point en litige, à savoir si 
un syndicat ouvrier est complètement libre de disposer de ses fonds comme il l'en-
tend ou bien si son autonomie peut être restreinte par des dispositions légales. 
Sous ce rapport, la Cour a décidé que les syndicats ouvriers ne sont pas des orga-
nismes complètement autonomes, mais qu'ils exercent une action au sein des cadres 
juridiques conçus afin de leur faire remplir un but précis de la politique gouver-
nementale, c'est-à-dire afin d'assurer la paix industrielle. Lorsqu'un syndicat: ouvrier 
acquiert une personnalité légale après avoir été accrédité et lorsque l'adhésion à 
un syndicat peut être posée comme une condition d'emploi, alors celui-ci ne peut 
s'attendre à pouvoir disposer à sa guise des sommes exigées de ses membres de 
sorte que l'Etat peut, par des mesures législatives, imposer des restrictions quant à 
l'usage des sommes exigées. 
Du reste, la Cour suprême du Canada a confirmé le droit des syndicats de 
faire de l'action politique et d'appuyer financièrement des causes politiques. De 
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l'avis de la Cour, cette législation contestée n'empêche pas un syndicat ouvrier de 
solliciter des fonds de ses membres pour des fins politiques ou d'utiliser ces sommes 
pour des fins politiques. Le point en litige devant les tribunaux n'était pas le droit 
de faire de la politique, mais le droit de se servir des sommes perçues par précompte 
ou comme condition d'appartenance syndicale pour appuyer un parti politique ou 
un candidat. La Cour a statué que l'assemblée législative, qui a par une loi, amené 
des travailleurs à se grouper en un syndicat ouvrier, peut protéger leurs droits 
civils en empêchant qu'ils soient obligés de contribuer aux activités politiques qu'ils 
n'endossent pas et peut par conséquent interdire l'usage à des fins politiques de 
sommes perçues comme condition d'appartenance syndicale. 
L A QUESTION DES DROITS DE LA MAJORITÉ 
CONTRE LES DROITS DES PARTICULIERS 
En démocratie, c'est la majorité qui gouverne mais les minorités ont des droits ; 
il semble bien qu'un équilibre nécessaire entre ces éléments constitue l'essence 
d'une société démocratique. Dans le domaine de l'action politique des syndicats 
et, particulièrement, en ce qui concerne l'emploi des cotisations syndicales pour 
des fins politiques, il s'agit de savoir si on peut respecter à la fois les droits poli-
tiques de la majorité syndicale et ceux des dissidents minoritaires. 
En Grande-Bretagne, la solution au problème du maintien des droits de la 
majorité, tout en protégeant les droits des minorités dissidentes, a été trouvée au 
moyen de la Loi de 1913 sur les syndicats ouvriers par la formule « contracting 
out ». 
Aux Etats-Unis, les tribunaux ont essayé de concilier les droits de la majorité 
avec ceux de la minorité, en appliquant le système britannique « contracting ont ». 
Au Canada, la Loi de la Colombie-Britannique sur les relations ouvrières 
prononce une interdiction absolue d'utiliser les cotisations syndicales à des fins 
politiques. Apparemment, afin de protéger les droits des particuliers, pour qu'ils ne 
soient pas obligés de contribuer des sommes à des partis politiques et à des causes 
qu'ils n'endossent pas, la législation n'a pas tenu compte des droits de la majorité 
qui pouvait approuver de telles contributions. Le manque de préoccupation pour 
les droits de la majorité et le refus du législateur de trouver une formule de com-
promis raisonnable, qui assurerait les droits légitimes de la majorité tout en proté-
geant les droits des minorités dissidentes, semblent être â la base de la faiblesse 
de la législation en question. 
